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Extensive cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits
for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary
success of our species is indeed due, to a large degree, to our unparalleled other-regarding abilities. Yet, a
comprehensive understanding of human cooperation remains a formidable challenge. Recent research in social
science indicates that it is important to focus on the collective behavior that emerges as the result of the inter-
actions among individuals, groups, and even societies. Non-equilibrium statistical physics, in particular Monte
Carlo methods and the theory of collective behavior of interacting particles near phase transition points, has
proven to be very valuable for understanding counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. By studying models of
human cooperation as classical spin models, a physicist can draw on familiar settings from statistical physics.
However, unlike pairwise interactions among particles that typically govern solid-state physics systems, inter-
actions among humans often involve group interactions, and they also involve a larger number of possible states
even for the most simplified description of reality. The complexity of solutions therefore often surpasses that
observed in physical systems. Here we review experimental and theoretical research that advances our un-
derstanding of human cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, on the spatiotemporal dynamics of
observed solutions, and on self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Human cooperation
Human cooperation is the result of our evolutionary strug-
gles for survival. Approximately two million years ago the
jaw-closing muscle of some hominids mutated, thus giving
space for larger brains, which in turn needed larger body size
to carry. As a result, our ancestors begun to mature more
slowly than other apes, which likely led to serious challenges
in rearing offspring that survived [1, 2]. Alloparental care
and provisioning for the young of others have therefore been
put forward as the impetus for the evolution of remarkable
other-regarding abilities of the genus Homo that we witness
today [3]. There also exist evidence that the conflicts between
groups have been instrumental for strengthening our coopera-
tive drive and for enhancing our in-group solidarity [4]. Since
all of this took place in the very distant past, evidence sup-
porting one or the other thesis is scarce and circumstantial.
But regardless of whether it was the slow development of our
offspring towards self-sustained existence, or the fear of being
wiped-out by our neighbors, extensive and comprehensive co-
operation, also among unrelated individuals, became the cor-
nerstone of our evolutionary success story [5].
Fast forward to the present time, it is clear that many of
the challenges that pressured our ancestors into cooperation
are gone. Nevertheless, we are still cooperating, and on ever
larger scales, to the point that we may deserve being called
“SuperCooperators” [6]. A more critical look, however, re-
veals several ups and downs to our more mature existence.
Undeniably, there is an abundance of technological break-
throughs and innovations that make our lives better. The 20th
century is often referred to as the century of physics. From x-
rays to the semiconductor industry, the human society today
would be very different were it not for the progress made in
physics laboratories around the world [7, 8]. Moreover, we
have basically conquered our planet, to the point that the only
real threat to us is ourselves. We are also compassionate, we
care for one another, and we are civilized and social. But at the
same time, and in stark contrast to these ups, our societies are
also home to millions that live on the edge of existence. We
deny people shelter, we deny people food, and we deny peo-
ple their survival. Many human societies are seriously failing
to meet the most basic needs of millions around the world [9].
Interestingly, the book The Better Angels of our Nature [10]
argues that our world is more peaceful today than it ever was
in the past. While statistically this may be true, it is probably
easy to agree that peace is more than just the absence of war
and death by armed forces.
We should be able to do better. In fact, we must do better,
because the current state seems largely unsustainable even in
the short term, let alone in the long term, with the tragedy of
the commons and doomsday scenarios as the one depicted in
Fig. 1 looming in the not so distant future. We thus need to
learn how to cooperate better with one another, and we have
to understand that our actions and the choice that we make ev-
eryday have consequences that go far beyond our local com-
munities. The problem, however, is that to cooperate more or
better, or even to cooperate at all, is in many ways unnatural,
and this is true for us as well as for all living organisms. Ac-
cording to Darwin’s The Origin of Species, natural selection
favors the fittest and the most successful individuals, which in
turn implies an innate selfishness that greatly challenges the
concept of cooperation. In short, cooperation is costly. As
such, exercising it can weigh heavily on individual wellbe-
ing and prosperity. If only the fittest survive, why should one
perform an altruistic act that is costly to perform but benefits
another? Why should we care for and contribute to the public
good if freeriders can enjoy the same benefits for free? Since
intact cooperation forms the bedrock of our efforts for a sus-
tainable and better future, understanding cooperative behavior
in human societies has been declared as one of the grand sci-
entific challenges of the 21st century [11, 12].
B. The role of statistical physics
At this point, one may question the relevance of physics in
all of this. Methods of statistical physics have recently been
applied to subjects that, in the traditional sense, could be con-
sidered as out of scope. Statistical physics of social dynam-
ics [13], of evolutionary games in structured populations [14–
17], of crime [18], and of epidemic processes and vaccination
[19, 20], are all recent examples of this exciting development.
The latter comes with a slight delay but strong support from
network science [21], which has been going from strength to
strength during the past decade and a half [21–28], delivering
inspirational results, models, and methods, that have revived
not just statistical physics, but many other fields of natural and
social sciences.
In this regard, the evolution of cooperation is no exception.
While research in the realm of biology has delivered kin selec-
tion theory [29], which rests on the fact that by helping a close
3FIG. 1: The Garden of Earthly Delights is a triptych painted by Hieronymus Bosch around the turn of the 16th century. The painting is housed
in the Museo del Prado in Madrid, serving as a didactic warning on the perils of life’s temptations. From left to right, we first have the meeting
of Adam and Eve, followed by a socially balanced state of wellbeing in the center, and ending with a hellscape that portrays the torments of
damnation. The picture was taken by Alonso de Mendoza, and reproduced here from the public domain of Wikimedia Commons.
relative to reproduce still allows indirect passing of the genes
to the next generation, and while other key mechanisms have
been identified that promote cooperation (including direct and
indirect reciprocity as well as group selection), network reci-
procity [30], in particular, has been the main motivator for the
involvement of statistical physics in this line of research.
The manifestation of network reciprocity relies on pat-
tern formation in a structured population, which provides a
more realistic description of reality than exactly solvable well-
mixed models. In the simplest case, a structured population
is described by a square lattice [31], where cooperators form
compact clusters and can thus avoid, at least those in the in-
terior of such clusters, being exploited by defectors. In short,
cooperators do better if they are surrounded by other cooper-
ators. However, the emergence of cooperation and the phase
transitions leading to other counterintuitive evolutionary out-
comes depend sensitively on the structure of the interaction
network and the type of interactions, as well as on the num-
ber and type of competing strategies [32–43]. Studies that
are unique to physicists have led to significant advances in
our understanding of the evolution of cooperation, for exam-
ple by expanding our understanding of the role of heterogene-
ity of interaction networks [32] or competing agents [44, 45],
the dynamical organization of cooperation [34] and popula-
tion growth [46], the spontaneous emergence of hierarchy
[37, 47–49], as well as the intriguing role of strategic com-
plexity [39, 50], to name only some examples.
Human cooperation is special in that we are intelligent
enough to enforce it when it is failing. As such, human co-
operation is subject to both positive and negative incentives
[51–55]. Positive incentives typically entail rewards for be-
having prosocially [56–62], while negative incentives typ-
ically entail punishing free-riding [63–71]. However, just
like cooperation incurs a cost for the benefit of the common
good, so does the provisioning of rewards or sanctions incur
a cost for the benefit or harm of the recipients. Individuals
that abstain from dispensing such incentives therefore become
second-order freeriders [72], and they are widely believed to
be amongst the biggest impediments to the evolutionary sta-
bility of rewarding and punishing [73–77].
Another rather unique human ability is tolerance, which is
the willingness to steadfastly endure something, in particu-
lar a trying circumstance such as the existence of opinions
or behavior, with a fair and objective attitude. Although nat-
ural selection favors the fittest and thus challenges coopera-
tion, tolerance and social norms in human societies may just
be the missing ingredient for cooperative behavior to prevail
[78–85].
The complexity of the mathematical models that result out
of taking into account the above considerations requires the
usage of methods of non-equilibrium statistical physics. In
particular, Monte Carlo methods and the theory of collective
behavior of interacting particles near phase transition points
have proven to be very valuable for understanding counterin-
tuitive evolutionary outcomes that allow cooperation to pre-
vail. In what follows, we review statistical physics research
done to advance our understanding of human cooperation.
In the first place, however, we present an overview of
human experiments, where we describe the goals and the
methodology [86], as well as review experiments measuring
4prosociality [87–90], punishment [66, 71, 91–95] and reward-
ing [57, 96, 97] (or both [57, 98, 99]), and network effects
[100–108].
We then present an overview of mathematical models,
where we focus on the public goods game as the null model
for human cooperation [109], with extensions towards incor-
porating punishment [110–112], rewarding [60–62], corre-
lated positive and negative reciprocity [50], as well as tolerant
players [82]. Next, we briefly review the methodology, in par-
ticular the Monte Carlo simulation technique [113, 114], the
theory of phase transitions [115–118], and the important con-
cept of the stability of subsystem solutions in structured pop-
ulations. We then proceed with the overview of results, where
we separately consider peer- [60, 75, 110, 119] and pool-based
strategies [111, 120, 121], the self-organization of incentives
for cooperation [61, 112], antisocial strategies [62, 122, 123],
as well as tolerance [82, 85]. We conclude with an outline of
possible directions for future research in the realm of statisti-
cal physics of human cooperation.
II. HUMAN EXPERIMENTS
Human experiments are a critical tool for testing predic-
tions of theoretical models and investigating human cooper-
ation. As the following subsections show, experiments pro-
vide clear evidence that people behave prosocially, even in
anonymous, one-shot interactions when real money is at stake.
Moreover, people are willing to enforce prosociality, punish-
ing selfishness and rewarding cooperation. It also matters
whether the structure of the interaction network is taken into
account, and whether the latter is fixed or changing over time.
A. Goals of human experiments
Models investigate what is theoretically possible, and the
focus of this review is models of the evolution and mainte-
nance of human cooperation. Experiments with human sub-
jects compliment theoretical work by describing human be-
havior, and testing predictions generated by models. In other
words, experiments test not what is theoretically possible, but
what empirically occurs.
Experiments investigating human cooperation typically
employ economic games, in which subjects make decisions
about how to divide real money between themselves and other
subjects (who are typically anonymous strangers). Within the
game theory community, the use of incentivized economic
games started gaining traction in the early 80s (e.g., [91]), and
has steadily grown in popularity ever since (for an overview,
see [124]).
The most basic use of experiments is to measure subjects’
behavioral tendencies in simple games [125]. To this end, re-
searchers ask subjects to make decisions about how to allo-
cate their money, often in contexts where they are anonymous
and thus there is no overt social pressure to behave a certain
way. For example, a simple game that can be used to mea-
sure generosity towards strangers is the dictator game [126].
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FIG. 2: Distribution of offers in a dictator game (blue) versus an ul-
timatum game (orange). Data come from collapsing across all incen-
tivized games in [126]. Subjects offer more in the ultimatum game
(where the modal offer is 50%) than in the dictator game (where the
modal offer is nothing), demonstrating that the threat of rejection
motivates increased giving.
This game involves a dictator and a recipient. The dictator
starts with an endowment of money (e.g., $10), and decides
how much to share with the recipient. The canonical dicta-
tor game is one-shot (i.e., the dictator makes one decision and
then the dictator and recipient never interact again) and anony-
mous (i.e., the dictator and recipient do not know each other’s
identities). Behavior in this game can thus be used to measure
generosity towards strangers, in the absence of any strategic
or self-interested incentive to give.
Experiments can also be used to investigate how play varies
across different versions of a game. For example, the inter-
action structure of the dictator game can be altered to give
the recipient power, as is done, for example, in the ultimatum
game [91]. In the ultimatum game, a proposer receives an en-
dowment and proposes an amount to allocate to a responder,
as in the dictator game. Unlike the dictator game, however, in
the ultimatum game the responder can either accept the pro-
posal, or reject it – in which case both players earn nothing.
Thus, while in the dictator game the dictator can unilaterally
decide how to allocate the endowment, in the ultimatum game
the proposer only receives her proposed allocation if the re-
sponder is willing to accept it. By giving power to the re-
sponder, the ultimatum game measures not simple generosity
but strategic generosity: how much does the proposer choose
to share, given the threat of rejection? Offers are generally
higher in the ultimatum game than the dictator game, demon-
strating that the threat of rejection motivates increased giving,
as illustrated in Fig. 2 [126].
Experiments can also manipulate whether a game is one-
shot or repeated, allowing researchers to investigate the power
of reciprocal play as a tool to promote cooperation. This com-
monly occurs in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma, which
models cooperation between pairs of individuals [127]. In this
symmetric game, there are two players. They simultaneously
decide whether to cooperate by reducing their own payoff to
increase their partner’s, or to defect by maximizing their own
payoff at the expense of their partner. If both players cooper-
ate, they each earn more, i.e., they each get the rewardR, than
if they both defect, in which case they both get the punishment
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FIG. 3: Cooperative behavior in repeated prisoner’s dilemma exper-
iments as a function of the “shadow of the future”, or the extent to
which future consequences exist for actions in the current period.
Data are reproduced from a review of prisoner’s dilemma experi-
ments in [52]. Specifically, the x−axis shows the amount by which
the continuation probability w (probability that two subjects play an-
other prisoner’s dilemma round together) exceeds the critical payoff
threshold (T +P −S−R)/(T −S) necessary for tit-for-tat to risk-
dominate always defect. In a population that is 1/2 tit-for-tat and 1/2
always defect, w < (T + P − S − R)/(T − S) means that always
defect earns more than tit-for-tat; w = (T + P − S −R)/(T − S)
means that tit-for-tat and always defect do equally well; and the more
w exceeds (T + P − S − R)/(T − S), the more tit-for-tat earns
compared to always defect. The y−axis indicates the probability of
cooperation in the first round of each repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game. When the shadow of the future is stronger, subjects are more
likely to open their game play with cooperation, demonstrating the
power of repeated interactions to promote cooperation.
P . However, if one player cooperates and the other defects,
the cooperator earns less than he would have if both players
had defected, i.e., he gets the sucker’s payoff S < P , while
the defector earns more than she would have if both players
had cooperated, i.e., she gets the temptation T > R. Thus,
cooperation is positive-sum, increasing the total payoff, but it
is always in an individual’s self-interest to defect.
If the prisoner’s dilemma is one-shot, then theory predicts
universal defection, as defection earns a strictly higher pay-
off than cooperation. However, if the game is repeated, and
it is possible for people to condition their cooperation on the
previous play of their partner. In this case, cooperation can
be sustained through reciprocal strategies ([5, 128, 129]): if I
know that you will only cooperate with me next round if I co-
operate with you now, then cooperation can be self-interested
– provided that the probability that we play again for another
round (i.e., the “continuation probability”) is sufficiently high.
This prediction is supported by experimental evidence: peo-
ple cooperatemore in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games than
in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, and cooperation levels
are increasing in the continuation probability, as illustrated in
Fig. 3 [52, 130]. Repeated play even promotes cooperation
among 10 to 12 year old children [131].
Relatedly, reputation effects can be investigated by manip-
ulating the observability of behavior. A large theoretical liter-
ature shows that reputation systems can promote the evolution
of cooperation [132], and experiments confirm that people are
more likely to cooperate when their decisions are observable
to others [133–135].
B. Experimental methodology
Economic game experiments have traditionally been con-
ducted in laboratories, in which experimental subjects (typ-
ically undergraduate students) are recruited to play games.
Typically, groups of subjects are recruited to participate at the
same time, so that they can interact with each other and be
paid accordingly. However, individual subjects usually do not
know who they are paired with, and decisions are kept anony-
mous. Subjects are usually fully informed of the rules and
payoff structure of the game, and are paid a fixed “show-up
fee” for participating, as well as a “bonus” payment based on
their game choices, and the choices of other players.
In recent years, conducting economic game experiments
on the Internet has become increasingly popular, particularly
through Amazon Mechanical Turk [86]. Amazon Mechanical
Turk is an online labor market in which employers pay work-
ers to complete “human intelligence tasks”, which are short
tasks for relatively low pay – and can include participating
in an experiment. Subjects (workers) can be paid a show-up
fee for completing the human intelligence task, and then a
bonus payment based on their behavior, and the behavior of
the other subjects (also Amazon Mechanical Turk workers)
who they are paired with. Amazon Mechanical Turk makes it
possible to quickly recruit large samples, and to obtain a rela-
tively diverse sample that is closer to nationally representative
than a university undergraduate sample. Moreover, evidence
demonstrates that, across a wide range of economic games,
game play is very similar on Amazon Mechanical Turk and in
the physical laboratory – even though stakes are generally an
order of magnitude higher in the lab [136, 137].
C. Measuring prosociality
1. Cooperation in groups
The most common experimental game for examining co-
operation among groups of players is the public goods game
[63]. In the public goods game, each member of a group (typ-
ically consisting of four subjects) starts with an endowment,
and decides how much to contribute to the public good. Con-
tributions are multiplied by the experimenter (e.g., doubled),
and then divided equally among all players. Thus, as in the
prisoner’s dilemma game, contributing to the public good is
positive sum, but strictly costly to the individual: no mat-
ter how much other group members contribute, it is payoff-
maximizing to contribute nothing.
In one-shot public goods games, substantial cooperation is
observed: the average contribution is typically around fifty
percent (although this varies based on factors such as the con-
tribution multiplier and the particular subject pool used). Fur-
6FIG. 4: Contributions in a repeated public goods game in 15 coun-
tries. Data come from the no punishment treatment of [87]. While
there is substantial cross-cultural variation in contributions, contribu-
tions decline over time (period) in almost every population. Figure
reproduced with permission from [87].
thermore, it is common to observe a bimodal distribution,
where the most common responses are to contribute nothing
or to contribute everything. Thus, many people are willing to
make substantial contributions to the public good, but a size-
able proportion contribute nothing. As a result of these defec-
tors, it is uncommon for public goods game cooperation to be
sustained over time when the game is repeated [57, 63]. The
key problem is that there is no way for players to cooperate
only with group members who are willing to contribute, but
not with defectors. Thus, “conditional cooperators”, or those
who wish to cooperate with other cooperators but not with de-
fectors, typically switch to defection as the game progresses –
destroying cooperation.
To truly understand human behavior, however, experiments
must investigate play in economic games across diverse cul-
tures. The vast majority of experiments focus on societies that
are western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic
(WEIRD) [138], and thus leave open questions of general-
izability and variation. Research on play in the public goods
game demonstrates that there is substantial cross-cultural vari-
ation in cooperation. In one study of 16 complex and devel-
oped societies across the world [87], rates of cooperation in
the first period varied between an average of approximately
70% contributed (e.g., Copenhagen) to an average of approx-
imately 40% contributed (e.g., Athens). However, the finding
that rates of cooperation declined over time in a repeated game
was remarkably consistent across cultures (Fig. 4).
2. Cooperation in dyads
While the public goods game measures contributions to
groups, the dictator game and the prisoner’s dilemma game,
described above, model prosocial behavior between dyads.
Play in these games also varies across cultures. For exam-
ple, the canonical result from the dictator game that play is
bimodal: most participants either share half of their endow-
ment, or nothing [139]. In other words, equality and com-
plete selfishness are the most common behaviors. However,
in a study of small-scale societies, there was sizeable variation
both in average sharing, and in the distribution of responses.
The Hadza hunter gatherers, for example, show a single mode
of sharing 10 percent [140].
Another popular two-player game in the domain of proso-
ciality is the trust game [141]. The trust game models a sit-
uation in which one person can trust another, and trust can
be met with either trustworthiness or exploitation. The trust
game has two players: a trustor and a trustee. The trustor starts
with an endowment, and decides how much, if anything, to
send to the trustee; anything that gets sent is tripled by the ex-
perimenter. Then, the trustee decides how much, if anything,
to return. Thus, the trustor stands to gain money if the trustee
is trustworthy and will return more than 1/3, but the trustee
always faces an incentive to return nothing. The amount the
trustor sends is, therefore, a measure of trust, and the amount
the trustee returns is a measure of trustworthiness. In the trust
game, trustors show substantial trust of trustees, and substan-
tial trustworthiness is also observed. Furthermore – implicat-
ing reciprocity effects – larger percentages are returned when
the trustor sends to the trustee [88]. Moreover, evidence sug-
gests that trustors show more trust of trustees who have pre-
viously cooperated with others, implicating reputation effects
[71, 89, 90].
D. Measuring the enforcement of prosociality
In addition to measuring prosocial behavior, experiments
are also used to measure the enforcement of prosociality. In
other words, are people willing to punish defectors? In eco-
nomic game experiments, punishment is usually operational-
ized as the opportunity to pay a cost to impose a larger cost on
somebody who has violated a norm, or transgressed in some
way. Punishment is thus different than “spite” because it is
targeted at a defector (as a way to enforce prosociality), rather
than a competitor (as a way to increase one’s relative payoff).
1. Punishment in public goods games
A canonical paradigm involves modifying the public goods
game to include the opportunity for punishment [92, 93]. Af-
ter each round, subjects learn howmuch each member of their
group contributed, and then have the opportunity to punish
other players. Typically, a substantial proportion of subjects
are willing to pay to punish, and punishment is systemati-
cally targeted at low contributors. Furthermore, as illustrated
in Fig. 5, including the opportunity for punishment increases
public goods game contributions – even in the first round
of a repeated public goods game. This result demonstrates
the power of punishment to promote cooperation, and shows
7FIG. 5: Public goods game contributions without and with punish-
ment. When punishment is not possible, contributions decline over
time. In contrast, when punishment is possible, contributions in-
crease over time. Figure reproduced with permission from [93].
that deterrence starts operating even before defectors have the
chance to personally experience punishment.
However, the positive effect of punishment on cooperation
is not universal across cultures. In some societies, people en-
gage in anti-social punishment, or punishment targeted at co-
operators [87]. Theoretical models show that natural selection
can actually favor anti-social punishment [122, 123], and em-
pirical work shows that anti-social punishment is more com-
mon in societies with relatively weak norms of civic cooper-
ation and rule of law [87, 142]. Furthermore, anti-social pun-
ishment can actually prevent punishment from functioning to
deter defectors (because it is still possible to be punished after
cooperating) [87].
Nonetheless, many people – especially in societies with rel-
atively strong cooperative norms – are willing to pay to punish
defectors in the public goods game with punishment. This
finding demonstrates a drive to reduce the payoffs of non-
contributors. But what is the basis for this desire to punish? In
the public goods game, an individual who punishes a defector
is retaliating against somebody who has harmed both himself
and other group members. Thus, it is unclear whether pun-
ishment in the public goods game reflects a drive to engage in
retaliation (“second-party punishment”, or punishment by the
individual who has been harmed) or a more impartial desire
to enforce norms of good behavior (“third-party punishment”,
or punishment by an unaffected observer).
2. Second-party punishment
Other punishment games allow researchers to tease apart
motivations for retaliation versus norm enforcement. The ul-
timatum game is the canonical game used to measure second-
party punishment [91]. In the ultimatum game, the payoff-
maximizing action for the responder is to accept any non-zero
offer: acceptingmeans getting something, rather than nothing.
However, if the proposer makes a small, unfair offer, rejecting
is a way to punish the proposer. It is costly to the responder,
but more costly to the proposer (because when the proposer
makes an unfair offer, she has more to gain from it being ac-
cepted than the responder does).
As noted above, proposers in the ultimatum game offer
more money than dictators in the dictator game, reflecting the
power of punishment to motivate prosociality [91]. Indeed,
this proposer behavior is rational: the payoff-maximizing of-
fer in the ultimatum game is typically substantially higher than
zero (and can be as high as 50% in some studies [143]), be-
cause responders are willing to pay to punish selfishness by
rejecting low offers. Generally, about half of responders reject
offers below 30% [124]. However, there is substantial cross
cultural variation in ultimatum game play, with some pop-
ulations almost universally rejecting very unfair offers (e.g.,
the Gusii) and others almost always accepting them (e.g., the
Shuar) [66, 140]. Nevertheless, in almost all societies, there
is some rejection of unfairness, and rejection rates decline as
offer size increases.
3. Third-party punishment
To measure third-party punishment, the canonical approach
is to modify the dictator game by adding a third-party pun-
ishment stage [144]. Specifically, a third player is given an
endowment, and can sacrifice some of this endowment to take
money away from the dictator. This third player can condition
his punishment on how much the dictator shared with the re-
cipient. Experiments show that providing the option for third-
party punishment increases prosociality [71, 94, 95]. More-
FIG. 6: Punishment in a third-party punishment game as a function
of offer amount across 15 small-scale societies, with areas of the
black bubbles showing the fraction of player 2’s who were willing
to punish that offer. Also shown are offers, with solid vertical lines
marking the mean offer, and gray shaded rectangle highlighting the
interquartile of offers. While there is substantial cross-cultural vari-
ation, all societies show some third-party punishment of unfairness,
and declining punishment as offers move from zero to half of the
stake. Punishment of hyper-generous offers (i.e., greater than half)
is almost never observed. Figure reproduced with permission from
[66].
8over, as in the ultimatum game, some third-party punishment
of selfishness is near-universal across cultures, and punish-
ment declines as dictators transfer more to recipients (Fig. 6)
[66]. Thus, people are willing to pay personal costs to pun-
ish selfishness, even when they haven’t been directly harmed
or affected in any way. However, comparing rates of second-
and third-party punishment reveals that the drive to retaliate
when harmed directly is generally stronger than the drive to
punish the mistreatment of others (e.g., [144]).
Recent research provides evidence that third-party punish-
ment may be motivated by reputational benefits [89]. Just as
trustors in the trust game send more to trustees who have pre-
viously cooperated, they also send more to trustees who have
previously engaged in third-party punishment [71, 89, 145].
These reputation benefits also appear to motivate punishment:
third parties are more likely to punish when their behavior is
observable [146]. Moreover, rates of third-party punishment
are reduced when potential punishers have the opportunity to
signal their trustworthiness more directly by sharing with oth-
ers [71], as predicted by theoretical models of third-party pun-
ishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness [71, 147].
4. Rewarding
Lab experiments can also be used to study reward, rather
than punishment. For example, public goods games can be
modified by allowing subjects to pay to reward members of
their group (i.e., by interspersing rounds of the public goods
game with the prisoner’s dilemma game) [57, 96]. These ex-
periments show that people preferentially reward those who
contribute to the group, and that this rewarding can sustain
cooperation when members of the same group interact repeat-
edly [57] – even when groups are very large and each player
can only be rewarded by one or two others [97]. Games in-
volving punishment can also be modified to include both re-
ward and punishment options, in which case both options are
typically used [57, 98, 99]. Evidence suggests that in some
circumstances, people prefer compensating victims to punish-
ing transgressors [148].
E. Experiments on network effects
Economic game experiments have also been used to explore
the impact of non-random interaction on cooperation. A great
deal of theoretical work has suggested that cooperation in the
prisoner’s dilemma can evolve when populations are struc-
tured into interaction networks - certain population structures
can support cooperation in contexts where well-mixed popu-
lations cannot (for a review, see [149]). In apparent contrast
to this theory, however, numerous experiments failed to stable
cooperation when players were arranged over network struc-
tures [100–104]. A closer inspection of the theory reveals a
potential explanation for this mismatch: one particularly influ-
ential line of theoretical work found that cooperation is only
evolutionary stable on networks when the benefit-to-cost ratio
of cooperation is larger than the average number of network
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FIG. 7: Cooperation as a function of network structure. Data come
from [105]. Subjects play a repeated cooperation game – in which
they choose whether to pay to cooperate with all of their neighbors
– within either a well-mixed population, a fixed network, or a dy-
namic network where 30% of pairs can update their network con-
nection status each round. While cooperation declines over time in
fixed networks and well-mixed populations, it is stably maintained
in dynamic networks where people have control over whom they are
connected to.
neighbors [150] (see also [151, 152]), and this condition was
not satisfied by most experiments. Indeed, a more recent set
of experiments show that fixed networks can stabilize cooper-
ative behavior, but only when this condition is satisfied [153].
Another body of experimental work on networks considers
the act that network structure is often dynamic: individuals
have control over who they are connected to, and can make
or break connections. These choices can thus be used as a
way to reward cooperative behavior (by forming or maintain-
ing connections with cooperators) or punish selfishness (by
avoiding or breaking connections with defectors). Theoretical
models predict that dynamic networks should be highly effec-
tive at promoting cooperation (for a review, see [15]), and in-
deed, this prediction is validated by experimental work. When
networks are dynamic, people preferentially connect to co-
operators, resulting in stable cooperation (Fig. 7) [105–107].
Interestingly, the positive effect of dynamic networks on co-
operation appears to be driven largely by the fact that defec-
tors are willing to try switching to cooperation, even when
their neighbors are defecting, in order to attract new partners
– rather than by cooperators being willing to maintain coop-
eration when their neighbors are defecting [108].
F. Pitfalls and the experiment-model divide
We conclude our review of human experiments by high-
lighting a common pitfall associated with using experiments
to test whether particular mechanisms for the evolution of co-
operation are actually effective at promoting human prosocial-
ity in the real world. It is common for experiments to test a
model by exactly recreating the incentive structure present in
that model in the lab, and then measuring human behavior.
However, in such experiments, people can use domain-general
strategic reasoning to determine what is in their self-interest –
9which will, by design, be to behave as predicted by the model.
Thus, positive results in such experiments do not necessarily
mean that the mechanism in question actually operates to pro-
mote cooperation outside of the laboratory (but merely that
the mechanism can promote cooperation when implemented).
For example, the fact that people engage in reciprocal co-
operation in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games does not nec-
essarily mean that direct reciprocity operates to promote co-
operation in daily life. While this is certainly possible, it is
also possible that subjects behave as predicted by reciprocity
models because they use reason to determine that in the ex-
periment, reciprocal cooperation is payoff-maximizing. Thus,
experimenters need to test predictions that can only be true if
the mechanism operates in daily life. For example, researchers
should search for evidence that people have preferences, or
show behavioral patterns, that would be beneficial if the mech-
anism operated in daily life, but are not payoff-maximizing
within the laboratory experiment – such as responding recip-
rocally even in non-repeated games where there is no finan-
cial incentive to do so [154], and doing so in an intuitive way
which is undermined by careful deliberation and considera-
tion of the details of the laboratory setup [155, 156].
As another example, consider models suggesting that third-
party punishment can serve as a costly signal of trustworthi-
ness, because the costs of punishing are lower for individu-
als who face incentives to be trustworthy than for individuals
who face incentives to exploit others [71, 147]. Consistent
with the hypothesis that this mechanism operates in daily life,
economic game experiments show that people who engage in
third-party punishment are trusted more than non-punishers
[89, 145] – and actually are more trustworthy [71] – in a one-
shot trust game. Because the trust game is not repeated, it is
always payoff-maximizing for the trustee to return nothing,
and thus for the truster to send nothing. Furthermore, noth-
ing is built into the incentive structure of these experiments to
create a link between the cost of punishment (which is always
the same for all subjects) and the incentives to be trustworthy
(of which there are never any for any subjects).
Nonetheless, people expect individuals who punish to re-
turn more money, and they actually do – even though doing
so is strictly costly within the game. These experiments thus
provide evidence that punishment operates as a signal of trust-
worthiness in daily life, and is unlikely to be explained by
subjects reasoning about what is payoff-maximizing within
the experiment. In contrast, domain-general reasoning could
lead subjects to the predicted results if the experiments were
designed to exactly recreate the model (e.g., by giving some
subjects an incentive to return money in the trust game and a
reduced cost of punishment). In sum, then, designing experi-
ments to test theoretical models in ways that shed interesting
light on human behavior is an important challenge.
III. MATHEMATICALMODELS
While the use of statistical physics for the better under-
standing of human cooperation can be considered a relatively
recent development, evolutionary game theory [157–161] is
long established as the theory of choice for studying the evo-
lution of cooperation among selfish individuals, including hu-
mans [52, 100, 153, 155, 162]. Competing strategies vie for
survival and reproduction through the maximization of their
utilities, which are traditionally assumed to be payoffs that
are determined by the definition of the contested game. The
most common assumption underlying the evolution in struc-
tured populations has been that the more successful strategies
are imitated and thus spread based on their success in accru-
ing the highest payoffs. Evolutionary dynamics based on these
basic principles is considered as the main driving force of evo-
lution, reflecting the individual struggle for success and the
pressure of natural selection.
Before presenting specific games to model human cooper-
ation, a note is in order regarding the networks that ought to
describe our interactions. In statistical physics, lattices are
used to describe structured interactions among particles in the
simplest terms [113, 114]. Examples of the most frequently
employed lattices are presented in Fig. 8. Despite their dissim-
ilarity with social networks that describe how we are actually
connected with one another [163, 164], lattices enjoy remark-
able popularity in human cooperation research [100, 153],
with the square lattice also being used for the seminal dis-
covery of network reciprocity [31].
There are compelling reasons for this being the case. A lat-
tice is the simplest of networks that allows us to go beyond
the well-mixed population assumption, and as such it allows
us to take into account the fact that the interactions among hu-
mans are limited to a finite number of partners, and that these
interactions are also inherently structured rather than random.
Moreover, as is well known, the structure of a network can
significantly affect evolutionary outcomes [14, 15, 36]. Fre-
quently, we want to eschew these effects in order to focus on
the mechanisms that may stem from sources other than the
properties of the interaction network. In general, lattices can
be regarded as an even field for all competing strategies, and
especially for games that are governed by group interactions,
such as the public goods game [109], using the square lattice
suffices to reveal all feasible evolutionary outcomes. Unless
stated otherwise, all the results reviewed in what follows were
obtained on one of the regular lattices depicted in Fig. 8.
A. Public goods game as the null model
The public goods game is simple and intuitive, as already
described in Section II, and it is in fact a generalization of the
pairwise prisoner’s dilemma game to group interactions [109].
In a group of players, each one can decide whether to cooper-
ate or defect. Cooperators (C) contribute c = 1 to the com-
mon pool, while defectors (D) contribute nothing. The sum of
all contributions is multiplied by a multiplication factor r > 1,
which takes into account synergistic effects of cooperation. In
particular, there is an added value to a joint effort that is often
more than just the sum of individual contributions. After the
multiplication, the resulting amount of public goods is divided
equally amongst all groupmembers, irrespective of their strat-
egy. In a group g containing G players the resulting payoffs
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FIG. 8: Different types of lattices. On the square lattice (left) each site has four nearest neighbors, while on the honeycomb lattice (second
from left) each site has three. In both cases the clustering coefficient C is zero. The triangular (second from right) and the kagome´ lattice
(right) both feature percolating overlapping triangles, having clustering coefficients C = 2/5 and C = 1/3, respectively.
are thus
ΠgC = r(NC + 1)/G− 1, (1)
ΠgD = rNC/G, (2)
where NC is the number of cooperators around the player
for which the payoff is calculated. Evidently, the payoff of
a defector is always larger than the payoff of a cooperator,
if only r < G. With a single parameter, the public goods
game hence captures the essence of a social dilemma in that
defection yields highest short-term individual payoffs, while
cooperation is optimal for the group, and in fact for the soci-
ety as a whole. If nobody cooperates public goods vanish and
we have the tragedy of the commons [165].
In a well-mixed population, where groups are formed by
selecting players uniformly at random, r = G is a threshold
that marks the transition between defection and cooperation.
If players imitate strategies of their neighbors with a higher
payoff, then for r < G everybody defects, while for r > G
everybody in the population cooperates.
Interactions among humans, however, are seldom random,
and it is therefore important for the null model to take this
into account. The square lattice, as already argued above, is
among the simplest of networks that one can consider. Thus,
let the public goods game be staged on a square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions where L2 players are arranged
into overlapping groups of size G = 5 such that everyone is
connected to its G− 1 nearest neighbors. In this case a player
x obtains its payoffs by playing the public goods game with
its G− 1 partners as a member of all the g = 1, . . . , G groups
where it is member. Its overall payoff Πsx is thus the sum of
all the payoffs Πgsx acquired in each individual group.
This null model – the spatial public goods game – has been
studied in detail in [166], where it was shown that, for an
intermediate selection intensity, cooperators survive only if
r > 3.74, and they are able to defeat defectors completely for
r > 5.49. Both theD → (C+D) and the (C+D)→ D phase
transition are continuous. Subsequently, the impact of critical
mass [167, 168], i.e., the evolution of cooperation under the
assumption that the collective benefits of group membership
can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the
group exceeds a threshold value, and the effects of different
group sizes [169–171], have also been studied in detail.
In general, it is important that in structured populations, due
to network reciprocity, cooperators are able to survive at mul-
tiplication factors that are well below the r = G limit that
applies to well-mixed populations. The r > 3.74 threshold
for cooperators to survive on the square lattice can be consid-
ered as a benchmark value, below and above which we have
harsh and lenient conditions for the evolution of human coop-
eration, respectively.
B. Punishment
Punishment is a form of retaliation or negative reciprocity
that, in whichever form, entails paying a cost for somebody
else to incur a cost [67]. In peer punishment, individual play-
ers take it upon themselves to punish defectors. In pool pun-
ishment, those willing to punish invest into a common pool,
from where resources are taken when it is time to punish a
defector. Antisocial punishment is a corrupt form of sanction-
ing, where punishers exploit their status by punishing those
that behave prosocially [75, 87, 123]. In the latter case, pun-
ishment simply becomes a self-interested tool for protecting
oneself against potential competitors. In what follows, we re-
view commonly used variants of the spatial public goods game
with punishment.
1. Peer punishment
The null model introduced above can be easily upgraded
to account for peer punishment [65, 93, 172]. Cooperators
that punish defectors (sx = P ) can be introduced as the third
competing strategy. In this case, both cooperative strategies
(C and P ) contribute c = 1 to the common pool, while de-
fectors contribute nothing. Moreover, a defector is fined with
β/(G− 1) from each punishing cooperator within the group,
which in turn requires each punisher to bear the cost γ/(G−1)
for each defector that is punished. A defector thus suffers
the maximal fine β if it is surrounded solely by punishers
(NP = G−1), while a lonely punisher bears the largest cost γ
if it is surrounded solely by defectors (ND = G−1). We note
that β and γ are introduced normalized with the number of
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other players in each group (G− 1), simply to facilitate com-
parisons with results obtained on other interaction networks
or by using differently sized groups (this is the case also in
all subsequently reviewed models in the Sections that follow).
In agreement with these rules, the payoff values of the three
competing strategies obtained from each group g are
ΠgC = R(NC +NP + 1)/G− 1, (3)
ΠgP = R(NC +NP + 1)/G− 1− γND/(G− 1), (4)
ΠgD = R(NC +NP )/G− βNP /(G− 1), (5)
where Nsx denotes the number of players with strategy sx
around the player for which the payoff is calculated. For fur-
ther details on the public goods game with peer punishment
we refer to [75, 110, 119, 172].
2. Pool punishment
Pool punishment is synonymous to institutionalized punish-
ment, where the contributions of punishers are meant to cover
the costs of institutions like the police or other elements of the
justice system independently of their necessity or efficiency
[173]. The situation thus changes in comparison to peer pun-
ishment, where the punishers pay the cost of punishment only
if it is necessary, i.e., when the defectors are identified in the
group and sanctioned. In the absence of defectors the income
of peer-punishers is thus identical to that of traditional coop-
erators. On the other hand, because of their permanent contri-
butions to the punishment pool the income of pool punishers
is always smaller than that of cooperators.
For the public goods game to accommodate pool (institu-
tionalized) punishment [111], we introduce cooperators that
punish defectors, whereby taking resources from the common
pool. The pool-punishers (sx = O), like traditional coop-
erators (sx = C), contribute a fixed amount c = 1 to the
common pool, while defectors contribute nothing. As always,
the sum of all contributions in each group is multiplied by the
multiplication factor r > 1 and equally divided among group
members. In addition, pool punishment requires precursive
allocation of resources, and therefore each pool punisher con-
tributes an amount γ to the punishment pool irrespective of the
strategies in its neighborhood. Defectors, on the other hand,
must bear the punishment fine β, but only if there is at least
one pool punisher present in the group. Denoting the total
number of cooperators (C), pool-punishers (O) and defectors
(D) in a given group g by NC , NO and ND, respectively, the
payoffs
ΠgC = r(NC +NO)/G− 1, (6)
ΠgO = Π
g
C − γ, (7)
ΠgD = r(NC +NO)/G− βf(NO), (8)
are obtained by each player x depending on its strategy sx,
where the step-like function f(Z) is 1 if Z > 0 and 0 other-
wise. For further details on the public goods game with pool
punishment we refer to [111, 120, 174].
3. Self-organized punishment
Models presented in above Sections III B 1 and III B 2 as-
sume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not
change over time. By allowing players to adapt their sanc-
tioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation,
we arrive at a model with self-organized punishment. More
precisely, on top of the traditional two-strategy public goods
game presented in Section III A, here each player is assigned
an additional parameter µx keeping score of its punishing
activity. Initially µx = 0 for all players. Subsequently,
whenever a defector succeeds in passing its strategy, all the
remaining cooperators in all the groups containing the de-
feated cooperator increase their punishing activity by one, i.e.,
µx = µx + 1.
We emphasize that the presence of defectors alone never
triggers an increase in µx. Only when defectors spread do the
cooperators resort to sanctioning. Conversely, if defectors fail
to spread, then at every second round all cooperators decrease
their punishing activity by one, as long as µx ≥ 0. We empha-
size that if the population contains cooperators with µx > 0,
then all the cooperators having µx = 0 become second-order
freeriders [72]. Due to the presence of punishers, i.e., coop-
erators having µx > 0, the accumulation of payoffs changes
as well. In particular, each defector is fined with an amount
pix∆/(G−1) from every punishing cooperator that is a mem-
ber of the group, while at the same time the punishing cooper-
ators that execute the punishment bear the cost pixα∆/(G−1)
for every defector punished. Here∆ determines the incremen-
tal step used for the punishing activity and α is a free param-
eter determining whether the sanctions are costly (α > 1) or
not (α < 1). Taking adaptive punishment into account, the
payoff of player x in a given group g is thus
ΠgC = r
NC
G
− 1−
1
(G− 1)
NDµxα∆ if sx = C, (9)
ΠgD = r
NC
G
−
1
(G− 1)
∑
y∈g
µy∆ if sx = D.(10)
In above two equations NC and ND are the total numbers of
cooperators and defectors in the group g, respectively. For
further details on the public goods game with self-organized
punishment we refer to [112].
C. Rewarding
Rewarding is common in human societies as a sign of posi-
tive reciprocity towards well-behaved, prosocial, or otherwise
kind behavior [58, 175]. Contrary to punishment, rewarding
entails paying a cost for somebody else to incur a benefit. In
peer rewarding, individual players take it upon themselves to
reward other cooperators, whereas the institutionalized variant
of this behavior foresees investments into a common pool that
are then used for rewarding cooperators. Similarly to antiso-
cial punishment, antisocial rewarding seeks to sway unworthy
recipients into actions that benefit those that reward [62, 176].
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In what follows, we review commonly used variants of the
spatial public goods game with rewarding.
1. Peer rewarding
To accommodate peer rewarding, the null model presented
in Section III A obtains rewarding cooperators (sx = R) as
the third competing strategy. Using standard parametrization
used thus far, the two cooperating strategies (C and R) con-
tribute c = 1 to the public good while defectors contribute
nothing, and the sum of all contributions is multiplied by the
multiplication factor r > 1 and then shared equally among
all G group members. In addition, here each cooperator (C
or R) receives the reward β/(G − 1) from every rewarding
cooperator that is a member of the group, and every reward-
ing cooperator from this group therefore bears an additional
cost γ/(G − 1). Denoting the number of cooperators, defec-
tors, and rewarding cooperators around the player for which
the payoff is calculated byNC ,ND, andNR, respectively, the
payoffs for each group g are
ΠgC = r(NC +NR + 1)/G− 1 + βNR/(G− 1), (11)
ΠgR = ΠC − γ(NC +NR)/(G− 1) , (12)
ΠgD = r(NC +NR)/G . (13)
For further details on the public goods game with rewarding
we refer to [60].
2. Pool rewarding
In comparison to pool punishment, pool rewarding is a
significantly more scarcely phenomenon in human societies.
There are plenty of institutions that enforce the law, but none
officially that would reward citizens for upholding it. As such,
pool rewarding exists mainly in certain subcultures of the pop-
ulation, where it is also often mixed with the antisocial variant
of the same phenomenon (for example in criminal organiza-
tions, where successful members are rewarded if they have
done their crime right) [62]. We therefore present a model
that incorporates both prosocial and antisocial pool reward-
ing. In parallel to the traditional version of the public goods
game entailing cooperators (C) and defectors (D), two addi-
tional strategies run an independent pool rewarding scheme.
These are rewarding cooperators (RC ) and rewarding defec-
tors (RD), who essentially establish a union-like support to
aid akin players.
Accordingly, rewarding cooperators contribute c = 1 to the
prosocial rewarding pool. The sum of all contributions in this
pool is subsequently multiplied by the synergy factor r2 > 1,
and the resulting amount is distributed equally amongst all
RC players in the group. Likewise, at each instance of the
public goods game all rewarding defectors contribute c = 1
to the antisocial rewarding pool. The sum of all contributions
in this pool is subsequently multiplied by the same synergy
factor r2 > 1 that applies to the prosocial rewarding pool,
and the resulting amount is distributed equally amongst all
RD players in the group. Here the focus is thus on the conse-
quences of union-like support to akin players, without consid-
ering second-order free-riding. It is therefore important that
we consider strategy-neutral pool rewarding in that individ-
ual contributions to the prosocial and the antisocial rewarding
pool are the same (c = 1), as is the multiplication factor r2
that is subsequently applied. Otherwise, if an obvious disad-
vantage would be given to either the prosocial or the antiso-
cial rewarding pool, the outcome of the game would become
predictable. We also emphasize that, in order to consider the
synergistic consequence of mutual efforts and to avoid self-
rewarding of a lonely player [177], r2 = 1 is always applied if
only a single individual contributed to the rewarding pool. For
further details on the public goods game with pool rewarding
we refer to [62, 178].
3. Self-organized rewarding
Models presented in above Sections III C 1 and III C 2 as-
sume that, once set, the fine and cost of rewarding do not
change over time. By allowing players to adapt their reward-
ing efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation, we
arrive at a model with self-organized rewarding. More pre-
cisely, in addition to cooperators (sx = C) and defectors
(sx = D), the game is contested also by rewarding coop-
erators (sx = R). Each rewarding cooperator received an
additional parameter µx, which keeps score of its rewarding
activity. While this parameter is initially zero, subsequently,
whenever a defector succeeds in passing its strategy, all the
remaining rewarding cooperators in all the groups containing
the defeated player increase their rewarding activity by one,
i.e., µx = µx + 1. The related costs increase accordingly.
However, to maintain the latter is unwanted, and hence at ev-
ery second round all rewarding cooperators decrease their re-
warding activity by one, as long as µx ≥ 0. The payoff of
player x adopting sx = C in a given group g of size G is thus
ΠgC = r
NC +NR + 1
G
− 1 +
∆
(G− 1)
∑
i∈g
µi, (14)
where NC , ND and NR are the number of other cooperators,
defectors and rewarding cooperators in the group g, respec-
tively. The sum runs across all the neighbors in the group,
while pii is the actual rewarding activity of player i. The cor-
responding payoff of a rewarding cooperator at site x is
ΠgR = P
g
C −
α∆
(G− 1)
pix(NC +NR), (15)
while a defector, who’s payoff is derived exclusively from the
contributions of others, gets
ΠgD = r
NC +NR
G
. (16)
It follows that each player adopting sx = C or sx = R is
rewarded with an amount µi∆/(G− 1) from every rewarding
cooperator, having rewarding activity µi, that is a member of
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the same group. At the same time, each rewarding cooperator
bears the cost µiα∆/(G − 1) for every cooperator that was
rewarded. Self-rewarding is excluded. Here ∆ and α are key
free parameters, determining the incremental step used for the
rewarding activity and the cost of rewards, respectively. Note
that α is actually the ratio between the cost of rewarding and
the reward that is allotted to cooperators. For further details
on the public goods game with self-organized rewarding we
refer to [61].
D. Correlated positive and negative reciprocity
As already emphasized, reciprocity is long considered an
important piece of the puzzle of human cooperation. If some-
one is kind to us, we are kind in return. We reward cooper-
ation. On the other hand, if someone is unfair or exploita-
tive, we tend to retaliate. We punish defection. According to
the strong reciprocity hypothesis [64, 179–181], positive and
negative reciprocity are correlated to give us optimal evolu-
tionary predispositions for the successful evolution of cooper-
ation. But is this really true? Should we reward and punish,
or should we do just one of the two, or maybe neither? Recent
economic experiments tend to reject the strong reciprocity hy-
pothesis [182, 183], and everyday experience also leaves us
with the impression that people will either reward cooperation
or punish defection, but seldom will they do both. Methods of
statistical physics can contribute relevantly to the resolution of
this so-called “stick versus carrot” dilemma [51, 58, 184, 185],
as demonstrated in [50].
In the public goods game with correlated positive and neg-
ative reciprocity, we have defectors (sx = D), cooperators
that punish defectors (sx = P ), cooperators that reward other
cooperators (sx = R), and cooperators that both punish de-
fectors as well as reward other cooperators (sx = B) con-
testing the game. As always, all three cooperative strategies
(P , R and B) contribute c = 1 to the public good, while de-
fectors contribute nothing. Moreover, a defector is fined with
β/(G − 1) from each punisher (P or B) within the group,
which in turn requires each punisher to bear the cost γ/(G−1)
for each defector that is punished. Similarly, every cooperator
is given the reward β/(G − 1) from every R and B player
within the group, while each of them has to bear the cost of
rewarding γ/(G − 1) for every cooperator that is rewarded.
In agreement with these rules, the payoff values of the four
competing strategies obtained from each group g are
ΠgD = r(NP +NR +NB)/G− β(NP +NB)/(G− 1), (17)
ΠgP = r(NP +NR +NB + 1)/G− γND/(G− 1) + β(NR +NB)/(G− 1)− 1, (18)
ΠgR = r(NP +NR +NB + 1)/G− γ(NP +NR +NB)/(G− 1) + β(NR +NB)/(G− 1)− 1, (19)
ΠgB = r(NP +NR +NB + 1)/G− γ + β(NR +NB)/(G− 1)− 1, (20)
where Nsx denotes the number of players with strategy sx
around the player for which the payoff is calculated. For fur-
ther details on the public goods game with correlated positive
and negative reciprocity we refer to [50].
E. Tolerance
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair
and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary
advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of toler-
ance in a population, a variant of the spatial public goods
game can be devised [82, 85], where in addition to cooper-
ators (sx = C), defectors (sx = D), and loners (sx = L),
tolerant players (sx = Mi) are also present in the population.
Here loners are players that simply abstain from the game and
settle for a small, but secure payoff instead [186]. Previous
research has shown, however, that defectors, cooperators, and
loners become entailed in a closed loop of dominance [187–
193], which maintains a Red Queen existence of cooperative
behavior that on average is no better than if everybody would
abstain [194, 195]. Tolerant players might yield a more favor-
able evolutionary outcome, whereby depending on the num-
ber of defectors i within a group, a tolerant player can either
cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.
Evidently, there are as many levels of tolerance as there are
possible defectors in the group, so that i = 0, . . . , G − 1. If
the number of defectors in a group is smaller than i the player
Mi acts as a cooperator, while otherwise it acts as a loner.
As such, the value of i determines the level of tolerance a
particularMi player has. The higher the value of i, the higher
the number of defectors that are tolerated by an Mi player
within a group without it refusing cooperation. As the two
extreme cases, i = 0 indicates that an Mi player will always
remain in the non-participatory loner state, while i = G − 1
indicates that anMi player will switch to a loner state only if
all the other neighbors are defectors. Importantly, regardless
of the choice an Mi player makes, it always bears the cost γ
as a compensation for knowing the number of defectors in a
group.
As is standard practice, all cooperative strategies contribute
a fixed amount c = 1 to the public good while defectors and
loners contribute nothing. The sum of all contributions in each
group is multiplied by the synergy factor r and the resulting
public goods are distributed equally amongst all the group
members that are not loners. Importantly, the r > 1 factor
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is applied only if there are at least two contributions made to
the common pool from within the group. Otherwise, a lonely
contributor is unable to utilize on the synergistic effect of a
group effort, and hence r = 1 applies. It is also a widely
accepted protocol that loners, who do not participate in the
game, obtain a moderate but secure payoff σ = 1. Moreover,
let ND be the number of defectors within a group. Diverse
tolerance thresholds can be introduced by using different δi
prefactors, which are δi = 0 if ND ≥ i and δi = 1 ifND < i.
Hence, the total number of contributors to the common pool
is
NTC = NC +
G−1∑
i=0
δiNMi , (21)
where Ns denotes the number of players in the group who
follow strategy s. By using this notation, the payoff values of
the competing strategies obtained from each group g are:
ΠD = r
NTC
ND +NTC
, (22)
ΠC = ΠD − 1, (23)
ΠL = σ, (24)
ΠMi = δiΠC + (1− δi)σ − γ. (25)
For further details on the public goods game with diverse tol-
erance levels we refer to [85]. Notably, a simplified version of
this model, with only a single type of tolerant players present
in the population at any given time, with the number of de-
fectors that are tolerated designated with the thresholdH , has
also been proposed and studied in [82].
IV. MONTE CARLO METHODS
The use of computers to solve problems in statistical
physics has a long and fruitful history, dating as far back as
the Manhattan Project, where analog computers were used so
frequently they often broke down. Digital computers, such as
the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer),
were intertwined with nuclear science from the beginning. In
fact, one of the first real uses of ENIACwas by Edward Teller,
who used the machine in his early work on nuclear fusion re-
actions [196]. Today, computers are used in practically all
areas of physics, and it is indeed difficult to imagine scien-
tific progress without them. Monte Carlo methods form the
largest and most important class of numerical methods used
for solving statistical physics problems [113, 114].
A. Random sequential strategy updating
When studying evolutionary games in structured popula-
tions presented in Section III, the Monte Carlo simulation pro-
cedure is used for random sequential strategy updating. The
usage of this established method ensures that the treatment
is aligned with fundamental principles of statistical physics,
and it enables a comparison of obtained results with general-
ized mean-field approximations [14, 197–200] as well as a
proper determination of phase transitions between different
stable strategy configurations. In what follows, we describe
the simulation procedure if the public goods game is staged
on a square lattice, although the elementary steps are of course
easily adapted to any other interaction network.
Initially, all competing strategies are distributed uniformly
at random (see also Section IVB below) on a L × L square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The microscopic
dynamics involves the following elementary steps. First, a
randomly selected player x with strategy sx plays the public
goods game with its G − 1 partners as a member of all the
g = 1, . . . , G groups where it is member, whereby its overall
payoff Πsx is thus the sum of all the payoffs Π
g
sx
acquired
in each individual group. Next, player x chooses one of its
nearest neighbors at random, and the chosen co-player y also
acquires its payoff Πsy in the same way as previously player
x. Finally, player y imitates the strategy of player x with a
probability given by the Fermi function
W (sx → sy) =
1
1 + exp[(Πsy −Πsx)/K]
, (26)
where K quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions
[166, 201]. In the K → 0 limit, player y copies the strat-
egy of player x if and only if Πsx > Πsy . Conversely, in the
K → ∞ limit, payoffs seize to matter and strategies change
as per flip of a coin. Between these two extremes players
with a higher payoff will be readily imitated, although under-
performing strategies may also be adopted, for example due
to errors in the decision making, imperfect information, and
external influences that may adversely affect the evaluation of
an opponent. Repeating these elementary steps L2 times con-
stitutes one full Monte Carlo step (MCS), which thus gives a
chance to every player to change its strategy once on average.
As an alternative to the above-described imitation dynam-
ics we also mention the logit rule, which is mathematically
equivalent to the statistics used in physics to describe the dy-
namics of spins in a Fermi-Dirac distribution [202, 203]. The
logit rule is also known as the myopic best response rule in
evolutionary game theory [204, 205]. According to the logit
rule, a player will change its strategy sx to another randomly
selected strategy s′x with probability
W (s′x → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Πsx −Πs′x)/K]
, (27)
whereΠs′x is the player’s new payoff if it changed to the other
strategy while the strategies of other players in the groups
where he is member remain unchanged. Unlike with imita-
tion, here a player is basically asking himself what would be
the benefits of changing his strategy, even if there is nobody
with a different strategy around. The logit rule thus yields an
innovative dynamic since new strategies can appear sponta-
neously [206], and recently many have considered this par-
ticular updating dynamics as it can leads to different results
if compared to imitation dynamics [207–215]. Instead of the
reproduction of the fittest returned by imitation dynamics, the
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FIG. 9: Failure of a random initial state to yield a relaxation to the most stable solution of the public goods game with pool punishment (see
Section III B 2 for the definition of the model). Presented is the evolution of strategy distribution for two different initial states. Upper row
shows the evolution from a random initial state, while the bottom row shows the evolution from a prepared initial state. Black, white, and blue
denotes players with defector (D), cooperator (C), and pool punisher (O) strategy, respectively. The correct stationary state is theD+C +O
phase in the rightmost bottom panel, not the O phase in the rightmost upper panel. In both cases identical parameters were used, namely
L = 390, r = 2.0, γ = 0.1, β = 0.79, and K = 0.5. Figure reproduced with permission from [111].
logit rule is more akin to a rational analysis of a particular sit-
uation, and as such it may be particularly applicable to model
human behavior. Nevertheless, the logit rule and its variants
have been seldom considered in the realm of the public goods
game, which is why we focus our review on results obtained
with the imitation dynamics.
Regardless of which microscopic dynamics is used, the av-
erage density or fraction of each particular strategy in the pop-
ulation (ρsx) is determined in the stationary state, after a suffi-
ciently long relaxation time, i.e., when the average fraction of
the strategies becomes time independent. Depending on the
actual conditions, such as the proximity to phase transition
points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns, the
linear system size has to be varied from L = 400 to 7200, and
the relaxation times range from 103 to 106 MCS. That is, if
one wants to ensure that the statistical error of results is small,
for example comparable with the line thickness in the figures,
although precise values depend on each individual case. It is
also important to note that random initial conditions may not
necessarily yield a relaxation to the most stable solution of
the game, even at a large system size. Therefore, to verify the
stability of different solutions, the usage of specially prepared
initial conditions is often necessary, or at least recommended,
as shown in Fig. 9. More information on the later issue is
provided in Section IVD below.
B. Random initial conditions
This subsection is devoted to clarifying an important mis-
conception that has to do with the use of random initial con-
ditions in Monte Carlo simulations of evolutionary games in
structured populations. It is often written that strategies are
initially distributed uniformly at random over a lattice or a
network to give each the same chance of evolutionary suc-
cess. Evidently, this has to do with the fact that random initial
conditions make certain that each strategy occupies about the
same amount of space in a population. But this alone does not
confer equal chances of survival to all strategies, in particu-
larly not if the competing strategies are three or more.
In fact, it is quite impossible to engineer initial conditions
that would achieve this, because stable solutions are not made
up solely of single strategies, but also of two-strategy al-
liances, three-strategy alliances that are perhaps entailed in
a closed loop of dominance, even four-strategy phases, and
so on. These are called subsystem solutions (see also Sec-
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tion IVD below)), and they can be stable individually, if they
are kept separate from other subsystem solutions. Of course,
when we begin studying an evolutionary game for the first
time, we are quite clueless as to which subsystem solutions are
stable and which are not at certain parameter values. Impor-
tantly, some strategies can survive only within two- or three-
or four-strategy subsystem solutions, and these subsystem so-
lutions first have to form in the population before they can
compete against each other. But different time scales charac-
terize the formation of different subsystem solutions. Accord-
ingly, no matter how hard we try, equal chances for survival
in spatial evolutionary games with three or more competing
strategies are rarely achievable, especially not with random
initial conditions. What random initial conditions, paired with
a very large system size, do accomplish, is they give a chance
to each subsystem solution to emerge somewhere locally in
the population, and the most stable one can subsequently in-
vade the whole population. At small system sizes, however,
only those subsystem solutions can evolve whose characteris-
tic formation times are sufficiently short.
Since we have no way of knowing which initial configu-
ration of strategies will yield a stable subsystem solution, our
best option is to use random initial conditionswith a very large
system size, and hope for all of them to emerge at some point
in time. After we identify them, however, it is much more
efficient and fair in terms of equal survival chances to use pre-
pared initial states, and to do a proper stability analysis of
subsystem solutions as described in Section IVD.
When considering emergent phenomena in human soci-
eties, it is also practically always the case that a movement
or a rebelion or an initiative starts locally, from a select ini-
tial state that is comprised of like-minded individuals. In this
sense, random initial conditions are perhaps the most unnat-
ural way to study human cooperation, but unavoidable due to
the reasons stated above.
C. Phase transitions
Phase transitions are at the heart of statistical physics [115–
118]. The statistical physics of human cooperation is no ex-
ception, as indeed most of the research revolves around de-
termining phase diagrams of the studied evolutionary games
and determining the properties of the phase transitions that
separate different stable strategy configurations. Tradition-
ally, of course, phase transitions describe transitions between
solid, liquid and gaseous states of matter. In general, near a
phase transition the thermodynamic features of a system de-
pend only on a small number of variables, but are insensi-
tive to the details of the underlying microscopic dynamics.
Thus, many macroscopic phenomena may be grouped into a
small set of universality classes, specified by the shared sets
of relevant observables. The universality classes are defined
by critical exponents, which can be identical for very differ-
ent physical systems. This coincidence of critical exponents
is explained by the renormalization group theory [216–219],
which shows that the differences are traceable to irrelevant
observables while the relevant observables are shared in com-
mon.
For the purpose of this review, we first recall that phase
transitions can be continuous and discontinuous, or equiva-
lently, second-order or first-order, respectively. Continuous
phase transitions can be characterized by critical exponents,
whereby in human cooperation, due to the spatiotemporal
dynamics of the competing strategies, the critical exponents
that characterize spreading processes play the most prominent
role. In such processes, phase transitions may exist to absorb-
ing states, where the density of the strategy that is receding
drops to zero. The order parameter is usually the density of
the strategy
ρsx(t) =
1
L2
〈
∑
x
sx(t)〉 , (28)
which in the supercritical phase vanishes as
ρ∞ ∝ |p− pc|
ζ (29)
as the control parameter p approaches the critical value pc.
Thus far, as we will review from Section V onwards, the pre-
dominant universality class characterizing models of human
cooperation has been found to be that of directed percolation
[117, 118], where ζ = 0.584(4) [220].
In addition to continuous phase transitions, discontinuous
phase transitions are also common in models of human coop-
eration, occurring for example as a consequence of indirect
territorial competition [110], or the spontaneous emergence
of cyclic dominance [60, 192]. A particularly exotic solu-
tion was observed in the public goods game with correlated
positive and negative reciprocity [50] (see Section III D for
the definition of the model), where the amplitude of oscilla-
tions that characterize the cyclic dominance phaseD+P +B
was found to be divergent and ultimately terminating in an ab-
sorbing phase. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we have to
measure the fluctuations of a strategy in the stationary state
according to
χ =
L2
M
M∑
ti=1
〈
(ρsx(ti)− ρsx)
2
〉
, (30)
where ρsx is the average value of the fraction of strategy sx in
the population. It turns out that in this case the scaled quantity
χ is size-independent, thus indicating a divergent fluctuation
as the control parameter approaches the critical value. The
cyclic dominance phase is therefore unable to exist beyond
this value despite the fact that the average fractions of all three
strategies are far from zero. Instead, the phase terminates via
a discontinuous phase transition.
D. Stability of subsystem solutions
It is important to emphasize difficulties and pitfalls that are
frequently associated with Monte Carlo simulations of evo-
lutionary games with three or more competing strategies in
structured populations. Foremost, it is crucial to choose a suf-
ficiently large system size and to use long enough relaxation
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FIG. 10: An example of a proper stability analysis of two subsystem solutions, namely the three-strategy D + C + L and the four-strategy
D + C +M1 +M2 phase in the public goods game with tolerant players (see Section III E for the definition of the model and Section IXB
for more results), which are separated by a discontinuous phase transition. The series of snapshots in the upper row shows the separation of
the lattice in two parts, each of which is initially randomly populated with the strategies that will form one of the two competing subsystem
solutions [panel (a)]. In panel (b), the subsystem solutions are formed in both halves of the square lattice, and accordingly, their competition
can start by removing the border between them (thus allowing strategy transfer across the border). Panel (c) shows an intermediate state during
the competition in which theD+C +L phase will ultimately turn out to be the winner. Here r = 2.80 and γ = 0.35. Panel (d), on the other
hand, shows an intermediate state during the competition in which the D + C +M1 +M2 phase will ultimately turn out to be the winner.
Here r = 2.81 while the value of γ is unchanged. Importantly, for both values of r the state depicted in panel (b) is qualitatively exactly the
same (both phases are individually stable regardless of which value of r is used). The two graphs in the bottom row depict the corresponding
(r = 2.80 left and r = 2.81 right) time evolution of the strategy densities. After a relaxation of 20 000 MCS (marked by an arrow), the two
subsystem solutions start competing for space. On the left side theD +C + L solution wins, while on the right side theD +C +M1 +M2
solution wins. The linear system size used for this example was L = 2400, but the snapshots in the upper row contain just a 200× 200 cutoff
of the whole population for clarity. Figure reproduced with permission from [85].
times. If these conditions are not met, Monte Carlo simu-
lations can yield incorrect one- and/or two-strategy solutions
that are unstable against the introduction of a group of mu-
tants. For example, a homogeneous phase of cooperators or
pool punishers in the public goods game with pool punish-
ment can be invaded completely by the offspring of a single
defector inserted into the population if only the value of r is
sufficiently low [111]. At the same time, defectors can be in-
vaded by a single group of pool punishers or cooperators if
initially they form a sufficiently large compact cluster, such as
a large-enough rectangular box.
As a short detour, we note that even if the competing strate-
gies are only two, such as for example in the null model of hu-
man cooperation (see Section IIIA), quenched heterogeneities
in the population, for example due to differences in the distri-
bution of public goods within a group [221], may also signif-
icantly complicate Monte Carlo simulations. More precisely,
quenched heterogeneities may evoke the existence of the Grif-
fiths phase [222], which has recently attracted considerable
attention [223, 224], also in studies concerning the evolution
of cooperation [225].
The essence of the problem of quenched heterogeneities for
the extinction processes has been well described in [226, 227],
where it was shown that such systems are frequently charac-
terized by patches of different sizes, providing better condi-
tions for one of the strategies (or species) to survive. Due
to the localization, the subordinate strategy can die out very
slowly on the separated (or weakly interacting) patches, with
an average lifetime increasing with the patch size.
Noest [226, 227] demonstrated that for suitable conditions
(determined by the distribution of patch sizes) the extinction
of the subordinate strategy follows a power law, whereby the
exponent depends on the parameters. The latter fact can cause
serious technical difficulties in the classification of the final
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stationary state, especially related to the (C +D) → C tran-
sition in game theoretical models, as demonstrated for exam-
ple in Fig. 3 of [225], where it can be inferred that even very
long simulation times might not be enough to reach the fi-
nal stationary state, although the trend (power law behavior)
clearly indicates the disappearance of the subordinate strategy
in the limit when the time goes to infinity. We note that in
such cases, an additional time-dependence in the background
can significantly shorten the relaxation time. For example, if
the quenched heterogeneities are varied on an extremely slow
time scale (much slower than is characteristic for the main
evolutionary process), the final conclusions remain the same,
yet the occasional variations can accelerate the extinction sig-
nificantly.
Turning back to the stability of subsystem solutions, indeed,
an evolutionary game with three or more competing strategies
has a large number of possible solutions because all the solu-
tions of each subsystem are also solutions of the whole system
[39, 50, 85, 111, 120]. The accurate location of phase transi-
tion points in phase diagrams, as well as the nature of these
phase transitions as described in Section IVC, can therefore
be determined accurately only by means of a stability analysis
of competing subsystem solutions. A subsystem solution can
be formed by any subset of all the competing strategies, and
on their own (if separated from other strategies) these subsys-
tems solutions are stable. This is trivially true if the subsystem
solution is formed by a single strategy, but is likewise true if
more than one strategy forms such a solution. Evidently then,
for any specific set of parameter values, more than one sub-
system solution exists. The dominant subsystem solution, and
hence the phase that is ultimately depicted in the phase di-
agram as the stable solution of the whole system, can only
be determined by letting all the subsystem solutions compete
against each other.
The winner between two subsystem solutions can be deter-
mined by the average velocity of the invasion front that sepa-
rates them. It is of course crucial that the competing subsys-
tem solutions, if they are formed by two or more strategies,
are characterized by a proper composition and spatiotempo-
ral structure before the competition starts, i.e., before the
front/interface between them is opened up to strategy inva-
sions. In general, one must perform a systematic stability
check between all possible pairs of subsystem solutions. For-
tunately, this analysis can often be performed simultaneously
if we choose a suitable patchy structure of subsystem solu-
tions where all possible interfaces are present in the lattice.
The lattice is in this case divided into several large rectangu-
lar boxes with different initial strategy distributions (contain-
ing one, two, or three strategies), and the strategy adoptions
across the interfaces are initially forbidden for a sufficiently
long initialization period. By using this approach, one can
avoid the difficulties associated either with the fast transients
from a random initial state or with the different time scales
that characterize the formation of different subsystem solu-
tions. One is then able to observe quite extravagant yet stable
solutions, like for example the cyclic dominance between de-
fectors, cooperators, and an alliance between pool punishers
and defectors, in the public goods game with pool punishment
(see Fig. 9 in [111] or Section VIA below).
As an example, we show in Fig. 10 the stability analysis
between two subsystem solutions, namely the three-strategy
D + C + L phase and the four-strategyD + C +M1 +M2
phase in the public goods game with tolerant players (see Sec-
tion III E for the definition of the model). In the phase di-
agram (see Fig. 33 in Section IXB below), the two phases
are separated by a discontinuous phase transition point, al-
though on both sides the two phases are individually stable,
i.e., are proper subsystem solutions. To monitor the competi-
tion between them, we launch the evolution from a prepared
initial state, where one half of the lattice initially contains
only strategies D,C, and L distributed uniformly at random,
while the other half of the lattice contains only the strategies
D,C,M1, and M2 distributed uniformly at random. As the
next step, we let the two subsystem solutions evolve to their
representative state in terms of the strategy frequencies and the
typical spatial pattern. Only when both reach their stationary
state we open the border by allowing strategy invasion through
the separating interface. Lastly, we monitor how the competi-
tion between the two solutions evolves, i.e., which subsystem
solution will turn out as the winner. The example depicted in
Fig. 10 demonstrates clearly that the final outcome depends
sensitively on the value of the synergy factor r. At the smaller
value of r the D + C + L solution wins, while at the slightly
larger value of r theD +C +M1 +M2 solution turns out to
be the dominant one.
We emphasize that finite-size effects can easily play an ob-
structive role in the stability analysis of subsystem solutions
illustrated in Fig. 10. If we start the evolution from a random
initial state using a small system size, it can easily happen
that we observe a misleading evolutionary outcome, simply
because the phase that would be a stable solution at a large
system size has no chance to emerge – for example, one of
the strategies that would be necessary to form it dies out be-
forehand due to the small system size. But that is not the only
caveat. Even if we use prepared initial states for the stability
analysis, we should be careful because the space (part of the
lattice) allocated to each potential subsystem solution should
be large enough for the latter to emerge. For example, the fluc-
tuations of strategies in the cyclically dominant D + C + L
phase could be extremely large, and therefore this subsystem
solution alone requires a large population to avoid fixation be-
fore the characteristic stationary pattern emerges. In this re-
gard, we note that the upper panels of Fig. 10 show just a small
patch around the border where the two solutions meet, which
is cut out of a large 2400 × 2400 lattice (not shown). This is
also why the periodic boundary conditions cannot be detected
in the four depicted snapshots.
Taken together, the stability analysis of subsystem solutions
is a key procedure that must be used to properly determine sta-
tionary states in evolutionary games in structured populations
if the competing strategies are three or more. Prepared ini-
tial conditions, a large enough system size, the partitioning of
the lattice with proper interfaces, and a sufficiently long relax-
ation time for all subsystem solutions to obtain their stationary
spatiotemporal dynamics before the interfaces are opened up
for strategy invasions, are thereby the essentials.
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FIG. 11: Spatiotemporal distribution of the three strategies in the public goods game with peer punishment at t = 10, 40, 150, and 1000
Monte Carlo steps (MCS) from panel (a) to (d). Cooperators (C) are represented by blue, defectors (D) by red, and peer punishers (P ) by
green color. The snapshots clearly demonstrate that the homogeneous domains of the C and P strategies compete separately against D, and
the more successful P strategy ultimately wins this indirect territorial competition. The cost of punishment is γ = 0.2, the fine is β = 0.3,
and the multiplication factor is r = 3.8. Figure reproduced with permission from [110].
V. PEER-BASED STRATEGIES AND THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION
With this section, we turn to the review of the most interest-
ing results in the realm of statistical physics of human cooper-
ation. In peer-based strategies, individual players take it upon
themselves to either punish defectors [75, 110, 228], or to re-
ward cooperators [60], or, as in the case of correlated negative
and positive reciprocity [50], to do both. In the following sub-
sections, we review results obtained with upgrading the null
model with peer-based strategies.
A. Peer punishment and indirect territorial competition
One of the more fascinating evolutionary outcomes of
peer punishment in the spatial public goods game (see Sec-
tion III B 1 for the definition of the model) is the emergence
of indirect territorial competition [75, 110], which allows
the counterintuitive survival of peer punishers even though
their payoffs in the presence of defectors are by definition
always lower than those of traditional cooperators. Accord-
ingly, in well-mixed populations peer punishers can not sur-
vive [74, 229]. In structured populations, however, peer pun-
ishers and cooperators segregate spontaneously into homo-
geneous compact clusters, and then compete independently
against defectors. Whoever is more effective in accruing space
from the defectors lays the groundwork for the extinction
of the other cooperative strategy. One example of this phe-
nomenon is illustrated in Fig. 11, where the blue cooperators
and green peer punishers segregate and compete separately
against the red defectors. Ultimately, cooperators die out be-
cause punishers are more effective in this competition.
Importantly, indirect territorial competition is commonly
the source of discontinuous phase transitions in game-
theoretical models. The control parameter in this case is the
ration between the cost of punishment γ and the punishment
fine is β. If punishment is sufficiently cheap, then peer pun-
ishers do better than cooperators. In the opposite case, if pun-
ishment is too costly, cooperators do better. Evidently, there
is precisely defined switch in this case, which gives rise to
a discontinuous phase transition between the C + D and the
C + P phase. The phase diagram depicted in Fig. 12 con-
firms this exactly. The inset, on the other hand, shows how
the overall cooperation level increases monotonously with the
fine for three different values of the punishment cost γ. It can
be observed that punishing cooperators always prevail for a
sufficiently large fine, independently of the punishment cost
γ. If the cost is lower than a critical value (γ ≈ 0.65 at
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FIG. 12: Full fine-cost (β − γ) phase diagram for the public goods
game with peer punishment, as obtained for r = 3.8 and K = 0.5.
Solid red line denotes continuous phase transitions, while dashed
blue line denotes discontinuous phase transitions. Different phases
are denoted by the symbols of the strategies that survive in the sta-
tionary state. Inset shows the overall fraction of both cooperative
strategies (ρC+P ) in dependence on the fine β, as obtained for pun-
ishment costs γ = 0.1, 0.3, and 0.65 from left to right. Similar phase
diagrams can be obtained for smaller values of r, where, however,
only strategy D survives at small values of the punishment fine. We
recall that r = 3.74 is the benchmark value beyond which a mixed
C +D phase is stable in the null model without punishment. Figure
reproduced with permission from [110].
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r = 3.8), the application of a sufficiently large fine will lead
to a discontinuous (C + D) → (D + P ) phase transition,
where punishing cooperators replace pure cooperators in the
two-strategy phase. It is important to note that, in the begin-
ning of the evolutionary process, C and P players may form
mixed cooperative islands. However, when defectors are not
in the neighborhood, the two strategies have identical payoffs
and thus become equivalent, and the strategy update dynam-
ics defined by Eq. (26) results in logarithmic coarsening that is
otherwise characteristic for the voter model [230]. Although
the coarsening is logarithmically slow, C and P players in
these islands segregate quickly, given that their size is typi-
cally very small. After this segregation, homogeneous clus-
ters of pure cooperators and punishing cooperators compete
separately against the defectors. When the punishment fine
is sufficiently large, punishing cooperators suddenly become
more effective against defectors than pure cooperators, so that
eventually the later are crowded out and replaced by the for-
mer. It is worth noting that discontinuous phase transitions
due to indirect territorial competition appear to be common
in evolutionary games in structured populations, as they have
been observed also in the public goods game with pool pun-
ishment [111] and in the public goods game with correlated
positive and negative reciprocity [50], the results for both of
which will be reviewed below.
Further with regards to the nature of the phase transitions
in Fig. 12, we note that while the population always leaves the
C + D phase via a discontinuous phase transition, the tran-
sition between the D + P phase and the P phase is always
continuous. The (D + P ) → P continuous phase transition
agrees with the directed percolation universality class conjec-
ture [231, 232]. Namely, the interactions amongst players are
short-ranged, and the order parameter, which is the fraction
of defectors ρD, becomes zero at the critical value of the fine
βc, where the population arrives at the absorbing P phase.
Accordingly, the exponent of the phase transition is expected
to belong to the universality class of directed percolation, for
which ρD ∝ (βc − β)
ζ with ζ = 0.584(4) in two spatial
dimensions [117] (see also Section IVC). Figure 13 shows
the decay of the fraction of defectors at a fixed punishment
cost γ = 0.1 when the fine β approaches the critical value
βc = 0.3262(1). The numerically determined critical expo-
nent is in good agreement with the mentioned exponent 0.584
for directed percolation, as indicated by the black solid line.
In addition to the results reviewed above, the considera-
tion of peer punishment in the public goods game offers addi-
tional insights into human cooperation that deserve mention-
ing. In the first place, there is the so-called “who laughs last
laughs best effect” [75], where peer punishers defeat cooper-
ators even when the defectors are eventually eliminated, but
this process is very slow. That is, the system behavior can
change its character significantly even after very long times.
The finally winning strategy can be in a miserable situation in
the beginning, and its victory may take very long. Secondly,
there is also a phenomenondubbed the “Lucifer’s positive side
effect”, where a permanent but modest generation of defec-
tors through small mutation rates can considerably accelerate
the spreading of peer punishers [228], effectively counteract-
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FIG. 13: Critical scaling behavior of the order parameter ρD for the
spatial public goods game with peer punishment, as obtained for the
punishment cost γ = 0.1 when the fine β approaches the critical
value ζc = 0.3262(1). The solid line indicates the slope 0.584, char-
acterizing directed percolation. Figure reproduced with permission
from [110].
ing the aforementioned “who laughs last laughs best effect”.
Lastly, it has been shown that peer punishment can lead to
hysteresis in the population that is otherwise characteristic
for systems that exhibit super-heating and super-cooling, ul-
timately leading to punishment being a double-edged sword
in that it can stabilize cooperation below the critical point, but
it can also stabilize defectors above the critical point [233].
We conclude this subsection by noting that more biologically-
oriented research on punishment in structured populations can
be found in [172, 234], while research on peer punishment in
some form relying or being connected to statistical physics is
in [235–244].
B. Peer rewarding and the emergence of cyclic dominance
While peer punishment has traditionally been considered
more successful than rewarding [67, 175], the fact that the cost
of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced
cooperation, as well as the fact that the act of punishment it-
self can be considered hostile and thus subject to revenge, puts
rewards back in contention as a viable catalyst for human co-
operation [56, 57]. The problem of whether to use punish-
ment or rewarding for promoting prosocial behavior is known
as the “stick versus carrot” dilemma [51, 58, 245]. By study-
ing the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods
game, where besides the traditional cooperators (C) and de-
fectors (D), rewarding cooperators (R) supplement the array
of possible strategies (see Section III C 1 for the definition of
the model), we can understand better the benefits and risk of
arguably the much more gentle form of cooperation enforce-
ment [60].
Figure 14 shows the full reward-cost phase diagram in the
low-r limit, where it can be observed that the pure D phase
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FIG. 14: Full reward-cost (β−γ) phase diagram for the public goods
game with peer rewarding, as obtained for r = 2.0 and K = 0.5.
Different phases are denoted by the symbols of the strategies that sur-
vive in the final strategy distribution. Solid blue lines indicate contin-
uous phase transitions. Bottom panel shows a typical cross-section
of the phase diagram at the cost γ = 0.01, depicting the fraction of
cooperators ρC , defectors ρD and rewarding cooperators ρR in de-
pendence on the reward β. Figure reproduced with permission from
[60].
first gives way to a very narrow region of coexistence ofD+R
and shortly thereafter reaches the pure R phase as the reward
increases. The blue transition lines, indicating continuous
second-order phase transitions, lean towards higher rewards
for larger costs, yet this effect is expected and validates the
behavior of the examinedmodel. Most remarkable is the reap-
pearance of defectors in a stableD+C+R phase if the reward
is increased further, thus giving rise to a stable coexistence of
all three strategies. Finally, if the reward is higher still and the
costs remain moderate (note that the slope of the rightmost
transition line is considerably larger), defectors again die out
and leave C and R as the only remaining strategies. Notably,
here C and R in the absence of defectors are not equivalent
strategies as was the case above for peer punishment (see Sec-
tion VA and [110]), and thus their stable coexistence is pos-
sible, which is a pure consequence of spatiality.
Turning to the reappearance of defectors for intermediate
rewards, we show in the bottom panel of Fig. 14 a characteris-
tic cross-section of the phase diagram obtained for γ = 0.01.
In agreement with the four blue lines depicted in the phase
diagram, we can observe four continuous phase transitions.
From left to right we have, first, the emergence of reward-
ing cooperators (ρR > 0), which is quickly followed by the
extinction of defectors (ρD = 0). Subsequently, defectors
reaper with traditional cooperators to form the coexistence of
all three strategies, and finally, at β ≈ 0.873 defectors die out
again. Interpreting these observations, for sufficiently large β
the rewarding cooperators can support each other and protect
themselves against the invasion of defectors. In accordance
with the well-known network reciprocity mechanism, reward-
ing cooperators aggregate into compact clusters with a smooth
interface. At still higher β, the efficiency of rewarding coop-
erators is so strong that defectors cannot survive. Remark-
ably, for β > 0.775 the support of cooperative actions be-
comes powerful enough to enable not just the proliferation of
rewarding cooperators, but also the survivability of traditional
cooperators. But since the synergy factor is low (r = 2.0),
the traditional cooperators are susceptible to exploitation by
defectors and can therefore survive only in the vicinity of re-
warding cooperators. Nevertheless, the emergence of tradi-
tional cooperators simultaneously enables also the survivabil-
ity of defectors via a stableD+C+R phase that is governed
by cyclic dominance.
The workings of this cyclic dominance can be demonstrated
by examining the snapshots of strategy distributions. Fig-
ure 15(a) depicts a prepared initial state, whereafter the move-
ments of the boundaries that separate the three strategies give
vital insight into the dominance between them. Due to the
small synergy factor r, the defectors (red) can easily invade
the blue region of traditional cooperators. Simultaneously,
since the reward is large, rewarding cooperators (green) can
outperform defectors. In the midst of rewarding cooperators,
however, traditional cooperators (blue) can spread as well be-
cause they enjoy the significant benefits of reward but do not
bear any costs. But as soon as some of the traditional coop-
erators depart from the safe haven of rewarding cooperators,
the whole circle of invasion starts anew, leading to an uprise
of defectors (red), who are then again conquered by rewarding
cooperators, who then again foster the spreading of traditional
cooperators, and so on. Clearly thus, the three strategies form
a closed loop of dominance, which can be observed nicely if
following the snapshots presented in Fig. 15 from left to right.
It is important to point out that qualitatively identical spatial
patterns emerge from random initial conditions if the system
size is sufficiently large (see Section IVB for a discussion).
The stability of cyclic dominance phases in structured pop-
ulations is always rather precarious. Namely, if one of the
three strategies dies out by chance due to a small system size,
the balance within the closed loop of dominance is broken,
and accordingly, one of the remaining two strategies spreads
across the whole population. To avoid this, it is therefore
paramount to use sufficiently large system sizes. Interestingly,
the stationary density of defectors is considerable, but the in-
crease of the ρD(β) function is the more dramatic the larger
the cost of reward γ. This is in agreement with the behav-
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FIG. 15: Spatiotemporal distribution of the three strategies in the public goods game with peer rewarding on a 100 × 100 square lattice with
specially prepared initial conditions. Colors red, green and blue depict the location of defectors (D), rewarding cooperators (R) and cooperators
(C), respectively. It can be observed that defectors invade cooperators, cooperators invade rewarding cooperators, and rewarding cooperators
in turn invade defectors, thus forming a closed loop of dominance that give rise to cyclical interactions and a spatiotemporal dynamics akin to
the rock-paper-scissors game [192]. The snapshots were taken at 0 (a), 140 (b), 560 (c) and 600 (d) full MCS, and the parameter values were
r = 2.0, γ = 0.05 and β = 0.9. Figure reproduced with permission from [60].
ior of predator-prey systems where the direct support of prey
will ultimately be beneficial for the predators. Naturally, if the
reward β is even larger, defectors cannot survive and the sys-
tem arrives to the mixed C +R phase, as depicted in Fig. 14.
Thereafter, the qualitative behavior does not change and the
fraction of cooperators and rewarding cooperators converges
to a nonzero value. This, however, is a unique consequence of
the spatial structure since in well-mixed populations cooper-
ators, i.e., second-order freeriders due to their unwillingness
to bear the additional costs of rewarding, clearly perform bet-
ter than rewarding cooperators and are thus dominant. In fact,
the mechanism that allows rewarding cooperators to survive in
the sea of second-order freeriders is identical to the one which
allows cooperators to survive in the sea of defectors in the
traditional public goods game. In both cases the subordinate
strategy forms compact clusters, and from there on classical
network reciprocity works its magic [31].
As the above results show, rewarding is certainly viable for
promoting human cooperation, but it is also quite a bit more
tricky than punishment. This has to do with the spontaneous
emergence of cycling dominance between the three compet-
ing strategies, which leads to counterintuitive effects, such as
for example that moderate rewards may promote cooperation
better than high rewards. Needless to say that these results
do not settle the “stick versus carrot” dilemma [51, 58], but
they do offer valuable insights that are unique to the statistical
physics approach to the problem.
C. Correlated strategies and an exotic first-order phase
transition
In addition to the “stick versus carrot” dilemma addressed
in the preceding subsection, there is also the strong reciprocity
hypothesis [179–181], which asserts that optimal enforcement
of cooperation entails both punishing and rewarding. This hy-
pothesis, however, is not aligned with recent economic experi-
ments [182, 183]. By considering the public goods game with
correlated positive and negative reciprocity (see Section IIID
for the definition of the model) and methods of statistical
physics, we can relevantly add to the preceding research on
this subject and help bring clarity as to the differing conclu-
sions [50].
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FIG. 16: Full fine-cost (β − γ) phase diagram for the public goods
game with correlated positive and negative reciprocity, as obtained
for r = 2.5 and K = 0.5. Solid red lines denote continuous phase
transitions, while dashed blue lines denote discontinuous phase tran-
sitions. More precisely, the dashed blue line between phases D and
D(B) indicates that there would be a discontinuous phase transition
if only D and B strategies were initially present in the system. The
same holds for the dashed blue line separating phases D(B) and P .
The three-strategyD+ P +B phase is separated with a dotted blue
line to emphasize that there are two different ways in which this so-
lution can give way to theD(B) phase. In particular, at smaller fines
the transition is continuous because the average fraction of strategy
P gradually decays to zero. At larger fines, the averages of all three
strategies remain finite, but the amplitude of oscillations diverges re-
gardless of the system size (see Fig. 18), which ultimately results in
an abrupt termination of cyclic dominance between the three strate-
gies and an exotic first-order phase transition (see Fig. 17). Figure
reproduced with permission from [50].
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FIG. 17: Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 16,
as obtained for β = 0.55. Depicted are stationary fractions of the
four competing strategies in dependence on γ. Stable solutions are
denoted along the top axis. Unlike around β = 0.37, here the
(D + P + B) → D(B) phase transition is discontinuous because
the amplitude of oscillations diverges independently of the system
size (see Fig. 18 for details) as γ increases. Figure reproduced with
permission from [50].
The phase diagram presented in Fig. 16 reveals that discon-
tinuous phase transitions dominate, which has to do with the
spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance [246–249] be-
tween strategies D, P and B. In particular, within the three-
strategy D + P + B phase strategy D outperforms strategy
P , strategy P outperforms strategy B, while strategy B again
outperforms strategy D. As was frequently the case before
[39, 111, 120, 250] (see [192] for a review), here too the spon-
taneous emergence of cyclic dominance brings with it fasci-
nating dynamical processes that are driven by pattern forma-
tion, by means of which the phase may terminate. There are
two qualitatively very different ways for theD+P +B cyclic
dominance phase to give way to the D(B) phase [here D(B)
indicates that either a pure D or a pure B phase can be the
final state if starting from random initial conditions]. The
first, around β = 0.37, is relatively straightforward, in that
the average fractions of strategies P and B decay due to the
increasing cost γ, which ultimately results in the vanishing av-
erage value of the fraction of strategy P . The closed cycle of
dominance is therefore interrupted and theD + P +B phase
terminates.
The situation around β = 0.55, however, is much more pe-
culiar and interesting. As results presented in Fig. 17 demon-
strate, here the average values of all three strategies remain
finite. Hence, the termination of the D + P + B phase must
have a different origin than at β = 0.37. In fact, for β = 0.55
it is the amplitude of oscillations that increases with increas-
ing values of γ. And it is the increase in the amplitude that
ultimately results in a uniform absorbing phase regardless of
the system size. At this point it is crucial to emphasize that the
increase of the amplitude of oscillation is not a finite-size ef-
fect. Although in spatial systems with cyclic dominance it is
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FIG. 18: Fluctuations of the amplitude of oscillations χ within the
D + P + B cyclic dominance phase in dependence on the vicinity
to the critical value of the cost γc = 0.1242(6) for β = 0.55 and
different system sizes, as indicated in the legend. The slope of the
power-law exponent (solid line) is 1, indicating divergent fluctuation
as γ approaches the critical value. Figure reproduced with permis-
sion from [50].
typical to observe oscillations with increasingly smaller am-
plitude as the system size is increased, this does not hold in
the present case. To demonstrate this, we measure the fluctua-
tions in the stationary state as defined by Eq. (30). As Fig. 18
shows, the scaled quantity χ is size-independent, thus indicat-
ing a divergent fluctuation as γ approaches the critical value.
The three-strategyD+P+B phase is therefore unable to exist
beyond this value despite the fact that the average fractions of
all three strategies are far from zero. Instead, the phase termi-
nates via a discontinuous phase transition towards the D(B)
phase, as depicted in Fig. 16. Notably, within theD(B) phase
either the pure D or the pure B phase can be the final state,
depending on which strategy dies out first.
In addition to the above results, the public goods game with
correlated positive and negative reciprocity also awaits with
indirect territorial competition and the spontaneous emer-
gence of cyclic dominance for certain parameter values [50],
much in the same way as already reviewed in Sections VA
and VB. Yet despite the high complexity of solutions, the
correlated strategy, which conforms to the strong reciprocity
hypothesis, can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic
parameter regions, thus lending support to empirical research
on this subject. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed
phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. These
results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in
human cooperation, which should also be taken into account
in future experiments.
VI. INSTITUTIONALIZED STRATEGIES
In this section, we turn to institutionalized strategies aimed
at promoting human cooperation that, unlike peer-based
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strategies, rely on contributions to a common pool for the ap-
plication of punishment and rewarding. Recent economic ex-
periments show that humans prefer pool punishment for main-
taining public goods [251], and evidence also exist in favor of
competitive advantages of sanctioning institutions [252]. In-
deed, the debate how to achieve human cooperation under ad-
verse conditions with a focus on whether this could be best
done by means of individual (peer-based) incentives or insti-
tutions is a lively one since the advent of this line of research
[253, 254]. Accordingly, the subject has received its fair share
of attention in the scientific literature [173, 255–262], while
of course the involvement of statistical physics in this arena is
a comparatively recent one [62, 111, 120, 263].
A. Spatiotemporal complexity due to pool punishment
It is likely no coincidence that the enforcement of law and
justice in modern human societies relies predominantly on in-
stitutionalized punishment [251]. The spatial public goods
game with pool punishment (see Section III B 2 for the def-
inition of the model), where defectors, cooperators, and pool-
punishers compete, thus addresses precisely the kind of setup
that is commonplace in human societies. Research in well-
mixed populations concluded that pool-punishers can prevail
over peer-punishers only if the second-order freeriders are
punished as well [173]. Conversely, in structured populations
self-organizing spatiotemporal structures can maintain pool-
punishment viable without such an assumption. In fact, the
phase diagrams indicate surprisingly rich and spatiotempo-
rally complex behavior depending on the punishment fine and
cost.
First, we illustrate the phase transitions determined by
means of Monte Carlo simulations as a function of fine for
a low value of cost. Figure 19 shows consecutive transitions
from the pure D phase on the left to the final D + C + O
phase on the right, in which all the three strategies coexist due
to cyclic dominance. Incidentally, the snapshots presented in
Fig. 9 correspond precisely to the emergence of thisD+C+O
phase, only that the upper row demonstrates a failure to do so
from random initial conditions, while the bottom row show
the evolution towards the most stable stationary state from
prepared initial conditions. As we have already mentioned,
the most stableD+C +O phase can also emerge and spread
from a random initial state, but only if the system size is large
enough, in this case exceeding L = 1500 for these (r, γ, β)
parameter values.
Returning to the phase diagram presented in Fig. 19, three
continuous phase transitions can be observed as we increase
the fine β at a low cost, for example γ = 0.01. First, the
homogeneous defector state (D) transforms into the coexis-
tence of defectors and pool-punishers (DO). In this phase,
pool-punishers form compact clusters to survive in the sea
of defectors. This mechanism is identical to the previously
identified network reciprocity that enables pure cooperators
to coexist with defectors [31]. Cooperators who refuse to bear
the cost of punishment, however, are unable to survive due
to the low value of r. Within the DO phase the frequency
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FIG. 19: Full fine-cost (β − γ) phase diagram for the public goods
game with pool punishment, as obtained for r = 2.0 and K = 0.5
with a focus on the small cost area. Solid (dashed) lines indicate
continuous (discontinuous) phase transitions. The dotted line rep-
resents the analytic continuation of the phase boundary separating
the pure D and O phases in the absence of cooperators (C). The
D + C + O phase is governed by cyclic dominance, just like the
(D+C+DO)c phase, however, in the later one strategy in the loop
is in fact an alliance of two strategies, namely strategies D and O.
For further details we refer to the main text. Figure reproduced with
permission from [111].
of pool-punishers increases continuously until the homoge-
neous O phase is reached. A quantitative analysis of both
these continuous phase transitions supports the directed per-
colation universality class conjecture [231] (see Section IVC
for details).
Surprisingly, further increasing β leads to an additional
phase transition from the O phase into theD+C +O phase,
where the self-organizingpattern is maintained by cyclic dom-
inance described above. Within the D + C + O phase ρO
decreases monotonously as the fine β increases, which is in
agreement with the anomalous behavior referred frequently as
the “survival of the weakest” [264, 265]. In the present case,
the increase of fine reduces the income of the punished de-
fectors, which allows pure cooperators to survive. The latter
strategy behaves as the “predator” of pool-punishers, result-
ing in the decay of ρO despite of the increasing fine. The
same cyclic dominance mediated complex interaction is able
to increase ρO when γ is increased (in this case the less ef-
fective punishment does not allow C players, who are the
“prey” ofD, to survive). Similar effects were already reported
in several three-strategy models, including the simpler spatial
rock-paper-scissors game, and the main features were justified
by mean-field approximations and pair-approximations (see
[192] for a review).
We note further that, at such a low punishment cost, the co-
operators can invade the sites of pool-punishers, albeit very
slowly and only within the territories they have in common.
Within these two-strategy territories in the γ → 0 limit the
strategy evolution reproduces the behavior of the voter model
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FIG. 20: Typical distribution of strategies within the (D+C+DO)c
phase on a 400 × 400 portion of a larger square lattice (L = 2000)
for r = 3.5, β = 0.2 and γ = 0.5 in the public goods game with
pool punishment. Notice that one “strategy” in the closed loop of
dominance is actually an alliance of two strategies (DO). Black,
white, and blue denotes players with defector, cooperator, and pool-
punisher strategy, respectively. Figure reproduced with permission
from [111].
with equivalent strategies exhibiting rough interfaces and ex-
tremely slow coarsening [230]. For low but finite values of
γ the two-strategy system evolves slowly towards the homo-
geneous C state while the interfaces remain highly irregular.
In contrast, the interfaces separating the domains of defectors
from cooperators or defectors from pool-punisher are less ir-
regular, thus signaling the more obvious dominance between
these two strategy pairs.
Another novel feature is the appearance of an additional
three-strategy phase within a narrow range of the parameter
space, namely the (D + C + DO)c phase. The correspond-
ing snapshot in Fig. 20 illustrates clearly that here the cyclic
invasions occur between the D, the C, and the DO phase.
This spatiotemporal structure can be reproduced very rarely
because of the fast extinction of cooperators if the system is
started from a random initial state even for L > 5000. In such
a case the system evolves into the DO phase that is, however,
unstable against the invasion of a cooperator block with a suf-
ficiently large size, e.g., 10× 10. It is also worth mentioning
that the resultant (D + C +DO)c phase will appear only af-
ter a long transient process. While the cyclic dominance of
alliances has also been observed in spatial ecological mod-
els [266–268], the public goods game with pool punishers,
however, offers an interesting new example when one strat-
egy fights continuously against a group of strategies, resulting
in a special and exotic but stable stationary solution.
In terms of the properties of the phase transitions towards
the (D+C +DO)c phase, Monte Carlo simulations have re-
vealed that the transition from DO to (D + C + DO)c is a
weakly first-order one, but can become continuous at higher
r values. The discontinuous nature of the phase transitions is
likely due to the different time scales characterizing the av-
erage formation and lifetimes of the competing phases that
depended on β and γ as well as on the multiplication factor r.
As can be inferred from the phase diagram and the sub-
sequent discussion, pool punishment can be stable without
any additional assumptions in the spatial public goods game.
However, the resulting spatiotemporal dynamics of the model
is very complex, and indeed impossible to understand without
methods of statistical physics. Closely related research has
also considered the competition of individual and institutional
punishment in the spatial public goods games [120], with the
conclusion being that peer punishers prevail and control the
system behavior in large segments of the parameter space,
while pool punishers can survive only in the limit of weak
peer punishment, when a rich variety of solutions is observed.
Paradoxically, it has also been observed that the two types of
punishment may extinguish each other’s positive impact on
human cooperation, resulting in the triumph of defectors.
To conclude, we note that the sustainability of pool punish-
ment is also important, in that in a population with freeriders,
punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the punishment
pool from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of
institutionalized sanctioning unsustainable. It was shown that
pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but
only if second-order freeriders are sanctioned as well, and to
such a degree that they cannot prevail. In this case, a discon-
tinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability
when punishers subvert second-order freeriders in the compe-
tition against defectors [263].
B. The non-existent institutionalized rewarding
The somewhat provocative title of this subsection is not
meant exactly literally, but as a reflection of the fact that
pool rewarding is much less common in human societies then
pool punishment, and that empirical research on this subject is
lacking. Perhaps accordingly, a dedicated effort to study pool
rewarding has not yet been made in the realm of statistical
physics, at least not in the same sense as the peer punishment
(see Section VA) and peer rewarding (see Section VB) have
been studied separately in the spatial public goods game. Nev-
ertheless, certain studies have considered pool rewarding be-
fore, and we briefly review some of the obtained results next.
In particular, in [121] optimal distribution of incentives for
public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments
have been studied, with a focus on institutional reciprocity
and the the effectiveness of pool rewarding. In the simplest
case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies,
all players receive equal incentives from the common pool.
The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribu-
tion of institutional incentives? In the realm of pool reward-
ing, how should we best reward individuals for cooperation
to thrive? The research has revealed that, if the synergetic ef-
fects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation
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in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the
simplest “equal rewards to all” principle. On the other hand,
if the multiplication factor is large, it was shown that it is then
best to reward high-degree nodesmore than low-degree nodes.
Interestingly, for institutional punishment the same optimiza-
tion problem turned out to be more complex, and its solu-
tion depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized pay-
offs are considered. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations and
mean-field calculations revealed that degree-normalized pay-
offs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than
low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs are con-
sidered, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger
than low-degree nodes. In this place, it is worth noting that
payoff normalization in the realm of evolutionary games is of
particular importance in heterogeneous interaction networks
[269–271], such as for example on scale-free networks [272],
where the absolute payoffs can be normalized with the degree
of each player to arrive at normalized payoffs.
As noted in Section IIIC 2, pool rewarding exists mainly
in certain subcultures of the population, where it is also often
mixed with the antisocial variant of the same phenomenon.
Antisocial pool rewarding has therefore been considered to-
gether with prosocial pool rewarding in [62], but we review
details of this research when focusing on evolutionary out-
comes with antisocial strategies in Section VIII, and in partic-
ular in Section VIII B, when we review specifically the lack of
adverse effects with antisocial pool rewarding.
VII. SELF-ORGANIZATION OF INCENTIVES FOR
COOPERATION
The assumption thus far, in Sections V and VI, has been
that when somebody rewards or punishes, this is always done
equally strongly. Evidently, the reality is different, in that
sometimes people are more keen on punishing wrongdoers,
while at other times less so. The same considerations apply
to rewarding. Here the concept of self-organization provides
an apt addition to the mathematical models, where thus the
adaptive nature of rewarding and punishing can be taken into
account [61, 112]. Akin to the concept of self-organization is
also the concept of sharing the cost of such additional proso-
cial actions, which has also turned out to work well in resolv-
ing high-profile obstacles towards human cooperation, such as
the problem of costly punishment [77]. In what follows, we
review research done in the realm of these considerations.
A. Enhanced network reciprocity due to adaptive punishment
Adaptive peer punishment on a square lattice has been stud-
ied in [112]. It has been shown that allowing players to
adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success
of neighboring defectors can explain both, the spontaneous
emergence of punishment, as well as its ability to deter defec-
tors and those unwilling to punish them. And perhaps most
importantly, this is achieved with globally negligible invest-
ments, such that the cost of punishment in the population as
a whole does not threaten to nullify the benefits stemming
from increased levels of human cooperation. The process of
self-organization thus significantly elevates the effectiveness
of punishment, and it reveals new mechanisms by means of
which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could
have evolved.
To corroborate above statements, we first present in Fig. 21
full r −∆ phase diagrams for different values of α (see Sec-
tion III B 3 for the definition of the model). Depending on the
parameter values, cooperators (C) and defectors (D) can dom-
inate completely, although a coexistence of the two strategies
(C + D) is possible as well. In panel (a), when the sanc-
tioning is cheap (note that α = 0.1 implies that punishment
costs are only 1/10 of the fines imposed on defectors), already
small values of ∆ suffice to restore a mixed C +D phase or
even a pure C phase at low synergy factors where otherwise
defectors would reign supreme. Continuous phase transitions,
depicted by solid blue lines, are the only means throughwhich
the stability of the two strategies changes. As the cost of pun-
ishment is raised, as in panel (b) to α = 0.5, introduces a qual-
itative change in the evolutionary dynamics. Below r = 2.7
the mixed C + D phase is no longer possible. Instead, dis-
continuous phase transitions, depicted by the dashed red line,
lead to the complete dominance of cooperators for sufficiently
high values of ∆. Expectedly, the lower the synergy factor r,
the higher the value of ∆ required to reach the pure C phase.
Still, even at r = 1 cooperators are able to dominate com-
pletely if ∆ > 6.5. At the border between inexpensive and
costly punishment, in panel (c), where α = 1 and thus the fine
and cost of punishment are equal, the evolutionary dynamics
does not change but we first observe a hard limit in r, below
which cooperation can no longer be sustained, irrespective of
how large∆ is. For α = 1 we find the limiting synergy factor
to be r = 2.48, which, however, is still well below r > 3.74
where cooperators are able to survive in the absence of pun-
ishment. Increasing the cost of sanctioning further to α = 2
in panel (d) increases the minimal value of r where coopera-
tors are able to survive, and the pure C phase is unattainable
if r < 3.99.
With the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, it is possi-
ble to show that adaptive punishment promotes cooperation
either through the enhancement of network reciprocity, or the
prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or through
the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction
antisocial behavior. For the last two we refer to the origi-
nal research [112], while the enhancement of network reci-
procity, also in comparison to traditional peer punishment (see
Section VA), is demonstrated in Fig. 22. In agreement with
the definition of the model incorporating adaptive punishment
(see Section III B 3), it is important to note that cooperators
with non-zero punishing activity (pix > 0) can exist only
along the borders separating the C and D domains. The pure
C phase, as well as interiors of large cooperative domains,
lack cooperators having pix > 0 because there is a constant
drift towards non-punishment if there are no D → C inva-
sions occurring in the neighborhood.
We therefore focus on the evolutionary dynamics along the
interfaces separating the C andD domains. We note that pre-
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FIG. 21: Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with adaptive punishment. Depicted are cooperators C and defectorsD that remain
on the square lattice after sufficiently long relaxation times in dependence on the synergy factor r and the incremental step used for adapting
the punishing activity ∆. Continuous phase transitions are depicted by solid blue lines, while discontinuous phase transitions are depicted
by dashed red lines. The displayed phase diagrams are for (a) α = 0.1, (b) α = 0.5, (c) α = 1, and (d) α = 2. If the punishment is not
costly (panels a and b), the social dilemma can be resolved completely, and accordingly, full cooperator dominance is always possible. That
is to say, there exists a sufficiently large value of ∆ irrespective of r, such that defectors are unable to spread and are eventually completely
eliminated from the population. In this case, cooperators emerge by means of a continuous phase transition from the mixed C + D phase,
while for somewhat larger values of α (panel b) the outbreak of cooperation is possible also by means of a discontinuous phase transition. As
the sanctioning becomes costly (panels c and d), however, the limits of adaptive punishment become clearly inferable. With increasing values
of α, both the survivability (mixed C +D phase) as well as the potential dominance (pure C phase) of cooperators shift towards larger values
of r, whereby as by smaller values of α, both continuous as well as discontinuous phase transitions can be observed. Figure reproduced with
permission from [112].
vious studies emphasized that smooth interfaces between the
competing strategies are beneficial for cooperators because
it allows the network reciprocity to take full effect. On the
contrary, rough interfaces provide ample opportunities for de-
fectors to invade and spread, even at relatively high synergy
factors. To demonstrate the positive effect of adaptive punish-
ment, it is instructive to start the simulation from a prepared
initial state corresponding to a rough interface, as depicted
in Fig. 22a (adaptive punishment) and Fig. 22e (peer punish-
ment). By following the snapshots in the lower row (panels e,
f, g and h) from left to right, we can observe that peer punish-
ment efforts fail to restore the broken phalanx of cooperators.
Due to the additional roughening of the interfaces defectors
can invade the cooperative domain very effectively, eventu-
ally leading to a pureD phase (not shown). For clarity in this
case traditional cooperators were taken out of the model, with
only peer punishers and defectors left to compete. Despite
of this lenient predisposition that eliminates potential nega-
tive consequences of second-order freeriding, however, steady
punishment still fails for the considered parameter values.
In contrast, the impact of adaptive punishment is signifi-
cantly different, as can be observed by following the snap-
shots in the upper row of Fig. 22 (panels a, b, c and d) from
left to right. Here the localized and temporarily very active
punishers, which emerge spontaneously as a response to the
D → C invasions, succeed in restoring a smooth (straight)
interface between cooperators and defectors. This in turn
disables defectors to invade, thus effectively enhancing net-
work reciprocity. The demonstrated recovery and preserva-
tion of smoothness along the interfaces is a key advantage
that is conferred by adaptive punishment. Importantly, once
the regularity of the interfaces is re-established the enhanced
28
(e) (f) (g) (h)
PEER PUNISHMENT
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ADAPTIVE PUNISHMENT
FIG. 22: The recovery and preservation of smooth interfaces that separate cooperators and defectors enhances network reciprocity. Depicted
are characteristic snapshots of the square lattice over time, where cooperators are depicted green and defectors are depicted red. Darker shades
of green indicate a higher punishing activity, while non-punishing cooperators are depicted bright green. A prepared initial state, corresponding
to a rough interface, is used to reveal the difference in the impact of the two punishing models. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the evolution
of the adaptive punishment model at 1, 3, 10 and 500 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. Panels (e), (f), (g) and (h), on the other hand, show
the evolution of the traditional peer punishment model at 2, 5, 10 and 20Monte Carlo steps. Note that all the punishing cooperators in panels
(e), (f), (g) and (h) are depicted with a slightly darker shade of green, as representative for players having punishing activity pix = 1. The
parameters used for both models were r = 2.8, α = 1, ∆ = 7.4, and a small L = 62 linear system size for clarity. The final state in the
adaptive punishment model is a pure C phase, while the peer punishment model yields a pure D phase (both not shown). Figure reproduced
with permission from [112].
effectiveness of network reciprocity spontaneously introduces
a decrease in the punishing activity, before eventually the lat-
ter altogether seizes once the pure Cphase is reached. Adap-
tive punishment thus allows for a spontaneous but prompt and
determined response to a threatening invasion of defectors,
which is unattainable with previously reviewed models.
We conclude this subsection by mentioning that adaptive
punishment has also been considered outside the realm of sta-
tistical physics research in [273], where it was shown that co-
ordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and
can proliferate when rare. The model eliminates key problems
associated with punishment, such as the difficulties of explain-
ing the evolutionary emergence of punishment because rare
unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and are hence
eliminated, or that the sum of costs to punishers and their tar-
gets often exceeds the benefits of the increased cooperation
that results from the punishment of freeriders. Essentially, the
conclusions are thus much the same as reviewed above, which
can be seen as an endorsement of the employed methodology.
B. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly
punishment
Although conceptually different from adaptive punishment
reviewed in the previous subsection, sharing the effort of pun-
ishment in a probabilistic manner can also be considered an
adaptive from of punishment. The model is a simple alteration
of the peer punishment model reviewed in Section III B 1, in
that here a probability p is introduced with which coopera-
tors within the group are selected randomly and designated
as peer punishers [77]. Inspired by the fact that humans have
strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, probabilis-
tic sanctioning was simply the simplest way of distributing the
duty. Based on this model, it has been shown that sharing the
responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on cer-
tain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem
of costly punishment, i.e., that punishment can be successful
even if the cost of sanctioning is significantly larger than the
imposed fines on defectors.
29
FIG. 23: Probabilistic sanctioning in the spatial public goods game promotes the evolution of public cooperation, yet the optimal outcome
requires carefully adjusted severity and frequency of punishment. Color maps encode the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
punishment fine α and the probability to punish p, as obtained for multiplication factors r = 3.6 (a), r = 3.9 (b), and r = 4.2 (c). Figure
reproduced with permission from [77].
Color maps presented in Fig. 23 depict the stationary frac-
tion of cooperators in dependence on the punishment fine α
and the probability to punish p for three intermediate values of
the multiplication factor r. Going from panel (a) to panel (c),
it can be observed that cooperative behavior becomes more
and more common, which is expected given that the bene-
fits of collaborative efforts increase through larger values of r.
The impact of α and p is more subtle. As the values of the two
parameters increase along the diagonal in the α− p plane, the
fraction of cooperators first increases, reaches a maximum,
but then again decreases. Increasing either of the two parame-
ters while the other is kept constant returns the same observa-
tion. Both α and p thus have a non-monotonous impact on the
cooperation level. At smaller values of r, as in panel (a), this
distinctive feature is more pronounced, but it remains present
at higher values of r as well, as in panel (b) and (c). Prob-
abilistic sanctioning thus promotes human cooperation, yet it
requires carefully measured efforts both in terms of severity
and frequency of punishment.
As often before, an understanding of the results presented in
Fig. 23 can be obtained with the study of spatial patterns that
emerge under the influence of probabilistic sanctioning. In
Fig. 24, characteristic snapshots of the square lattice for three
different values of p are presented. It turns out that, when plot-
ting the spatial distributions of strategies, it is often helpful to
use different colors to distinguish cooperators based on their
propensity to punish. Cooperators that are randomly selected
as punishers in at least three of the five groups in which they
are involved are depicted green, while other cooperators are
depicted blue. Defectors are depicted red. If punishment is
not an option (p = 0), cooperators have to rely solely on net-
work reciprocity to survive in the presence of defectors. As
panels (a) to (d) illustrate, cooperators form small yet com-
pact clusters that protect them from the invasions of defectors.
This is the hallmark of network reciprocity, discovered first by
Nowak and May [31]. It is important to note that in the ab-
sence of punishment the interfaces that separate cooperators
and defectors are not smooth. This creates ample opportu-
nities for defectors to invade successfully, but it also quickly
leaves them surrounded by players of the same kind. Since lo-
cally there is nobody left to exploit the invasion is stopped, but
it also creates new irregularities along the interface which will
invite further invasions in the future. The dynamical equilib-
rium of these elementary processes yields a stable coexistence
of cooperators and defectors. At the other extreme, if all co-
operators are always ready to punish (p = 1), the morphology
of the spatial patterns is slightly different. As panels (j) and
(k) in Fig. 24 illustrate, due to the consistent application of
punishment the interfaces are somewhat smoother. Individ-
ual defectors deep in the bulk of punishers struggle to invade
because they are immediately sanctioned. At the same time,
the cost of sanctioning is shared by many punishers, which
conveys them a local evolutionary advantage. However, at the
front where many defectors meet with punishers the cost of
sanctioning become prohibitive, and ultimately defectors eas-
ily prevail, as shown in panel (l). If the application of sanc-
tioning is probabilistic (p = 0.5), the direction of invasion
is reversed. As illustrated in panels (e) to (h), defectors are
eventually completely eliminated from the population. This is
because probabilistic sanctioning preserves the smoothness of
cooperative interfaces, while at the same time the mixture of
pure cooperators and punishers can prevail in the direct com-
petition against defectors. Paradoxically, the option to resort
to second-order freeriding provides the necessary relief from
the punishment costs, which in turn maintains a healthy fit-
ness of the cooperative domains. The key to success is that
the costs of sanctioning are shared.
It is also instructive to monitored the elementary invasion
processes between the competing domains of strategies, the
results of which are summarized as pie diagrams that depict
the ratios of different invasion steps at corresponding values
of p at the right of Fig 24. The pie diagrams confirm that the
frequency of defector invasions for p = 0 and p = 1 is higher
than the frequency of cooperator invasions, which ultimately
results in states where defection is widespread, as in panels
(d) and (l). For p = 0.5, on the other hand, the combined fre-
quency of C → D and P → D invasions is higher than the
combined reverse, and as a result the cooperators collectively
rise to complete dominance. A careful comparison reveals fur-
ther that the majority of invasion steps that reduce the number
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FIG. 24: Spatial pattern formation reveals evolutionary advantages of probabilistic sanctioning. In the absence of punishers (panels a to d)
cooperators alone struggle to uphold compact cooperative clusters. If everybody punishes the costs of sanctioning are prohibitive to success
and defectors win (panels i to l). If the responsibility to sanction is shared 50:50 randomly, cooperative clusters remain compact and smooth,
and at the same time their fitness is superior to that of defectors (panels e to h). The direction of invasion therefore reverses and cooperators
win. Cooperators who are willing to punish defectors in at least three out of the five groups are depicted green, while other cooperators are
depicted blue. Defectors are depicted red. Pie diagrams on the right show the corresponding ratio of elementary invasions between different
strategy pairs, confirming that probabilistic sanctioning tips the balance in favor of cooperation. Different shades of red have been used to
distinguish between D → C and D → P invasions. In all three cases the evolution starts from a random initial state using r = 4 and α = 2.
Figure reproduced with permission from [77].
of defectors is due to cooperators that do not punish. In other
words, second-order freeriders become stronger against de-
fectors due to the probabilistic presence of punishers. The pie
diagrams also highlight thatC can beatD only in the presence
of P , thus indicating that a multi-point interaction is necessary
to observe the reported counterintuitive phenomenon.
We conclude this subsection by noting that above observa-
tions can be summarized as “two weaker strategies are able
to form a stronger one”, which is reminiscent of the famous
Parrondo’s paradox [274, 275], where two losing games, if
combined, can become a winning game.
C. Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
In the spirit of properly addressing the long-standing “stick
versus carrot” dilemma [51, 58], the adaptive punishment
model reviewed in Section VIIA deserve a counterpart with
rewarding. Adaptive peer rewarding on a square lattice has
therefore been studied in [61], and we have reviewed the
model in Section III C 3. Statistical physics research in the
realm of this model has revealed that allowing for the act of
rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of co-
operation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill
new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted.
Ranging from indirect territorial competition, which we have
reviewed in detail in Section VA in the realm of peer pun-
ishment, to the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance,
which we have reviewed in detail in Section VB in the realm
of peer rewarding, phase diagrams and the underlying spa-
tial patterns for adaptive rewarding in the spatial public goods
game reveal fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains
why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. At the
same time, comparisons with adaptive punishment have un-
covered an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to
over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of
network reciprocity.
Figure 25 features a representative phase diagrams for the
public goods game with adaptive punishment, as obtained for
r = 3.5. Interestingly, discontinuous phase transitions are
absent, although they do occur in the model for higher values
of r (see Fig. 2 in [61]). It can be observed that, if the cost
of rewarding α (α is actually the ratio between the cost of
rewarding and the reward that is allotted to cooperators) is
substantial, defectors are the only ones to survive. Naturally,
the lower the value of r the lower the value of α that still
warrants defector dominance. The pureD phase becomes the
two-strategy D + R phase by means of a continuous phase
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FIG. 25: Full ∆ − α phase diagram for the public goods game with
adaptive rewarding, as obtained for r = 3.5 andK = 0.5. Blue solid
lines depict continuous, second-order phase transitions, and symbols
mark the surviving strategies in the stationary state. Since the mul-
tiplication factor r is too small, cooperators can not survive alone in
the presence of defectors. Accordingly, theD+C phase is missing.
Instead, as ∆ increases, and if α is sufficiently small, the pure D
phase gives way to the two-strategyD+R phase, which may further
transform into the three-strategyD+C+R phase. At r = 2, for ex-
ample (not shown), the three-strategy phase is no longer attainable on
the considered ∆− α plane. For small rewarding costs the defector-
free R(C) phase is obtained, although its area shrinks continuously
as r increases. Notably, in the absence of defectors strategies R and
C become equivalent. The evolutionary process therefore proceeds
via slow logarithmic coarsening, as in the voter model [230], but
since at the time of extinction of defectors the majority of players
are rewarding cooperators, the system finally arrives at the R phase
with a significantly higher probability than to the C phase. Figure
reproduced with permission from [61].
transition, if only the value of ∆, which is the incremental
step used for the rewarding activity, is not too small and the
value of α is not too large. Continuing further towards more
efficient rewarding may lead to the defector-free R(C) state,
which has the same properties as the voter model [230], where
the coarsening is logarithmically slow.
The second-order freeriders, i.e., traditional cooperators
who do not reward, on the other hand, can survive only in
the three-strategyD + C + R phase, but its existence is lim-
ited to high values of ∆, intermediate values of α, and still
sufficiently high values of r, as can be observed in Fig. 25.
Importantly, in this phase cooperators cannot survive alone if
surrounded solely by defectors. In fact, they can survive only
where defectors and rewarding cooperators meet, i.e., along
theD+R interfaces. Precisely how this phase emerges is in-
ferable from the cross-section of the phase diagram presented
in Fig. 26, which reveals that as α exceeds a critical value the
efficiency of R weakens to the point where defectors are able
to survive. The stable presence of a small fraction of coop-
erators, surviving at the D + R interfaces, accompanies this
transition. Interestingly, as α is further increased the first to
extinct are not rewarding cooperators but traditional cooper-
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FIG. 26: A cross section of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 25,
as obtained for ∆ = 2.0. As α increases the rewarding cooperators
first give way to a three-strategy D + C + R phase, but further on
persevere longer than second-order freeriders. At smaller values of
r the latter require a delicate balance of conditions to survive, and
can do so only along the D + R interfaces. Figure reproduced with
permission from [61].
ators, who fail to harvest the benefits of decreased rewarding
efficiency. This indicates that, especially at small synergy fac-
tors, only a fine balance of all the other parameters enables the
survival of second-order freeriding.
We conclude this subsection by reviewing results where the
efficiency of adaptive rewarding is directly compared with the
efficiency of adaptive punishment, thus addressing the “stick
versus carrot” dilemma. By determining the minimally re-
quired value of ∆ that warrants the complete elimination of
defectors with either adaptive rewarding or adaptive punish-
ment, it was shown that adaptive punishment, which was stud-
ied separately in [112] and reviewed in Section VIIA, is more
effective than adaptive rewarding in warranting defector-free
states (see Fig. 7 in [61]). An intuitive explanation as to why
this is the case is presented in Fig. 27, where we can fol-
low the evolution of interfaces separating defectors and adap-
tively punishing cooperators (top row) as well as defectors and
adaptively rewarding cooperators (bottom row) under identi-
cal conditions. It can be observed that while rewarding coop-
erators are more successful in penetrating the area of defec-
tors, the punishing cooperators advance less fast but maintain
a compact phase. For example, in the third snapshot from
the left, some rewarding cooperators have already reached the
border of the lattice while punishing cooperators have yet to
advance notably. However, rewarding cooperators have to pay
a price for their over-aggressive invasion, namely an irregular
interface that facilitates the coexistence with defectors. Para-
doxically, the less aggressive effect of punishment, which fo-
cuses on repairing the cracks in the phalanx rather than on
advancing into the territory of defectors at any cost, turns out
to be more effective at the end. Punishing cooperators rise
to complete dominance with the aid of a near flawless sup-
port of network reciprocity [31] (see Section VIIA for more
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FIG. 27: Comparison of the evolution of interfaces separating adaptive punishers and defectors (top row), and adaptive rewarding cooperators
and defectors (bottom row). It can be observed that, while rewarding cooperators (green) advance faster into the territory of defectors (red),
the punishing cooperators (gray) are relentlessly bent on keeping their phase compact. Although the punishers therefore advance slower, they
ultimately succeed in completely eliminating the defectors. Rewarding cooperators, on the other hand, have to make do with their coexistence.
Note that darker shades of gray (green) denote players with higher punishing (rewarding) activity. The parameter values are the same for both
cases, namely r = 2, ∆ = 2 and α = 0.4, while the snapshots were taken at 1, 70, 300, 1000, 3000 and 6000 full Mote Carlo Steps. Figure
reproduced with permission from [61].
details). Rewarding cooperators, on the other hand, sacrifice
the latter for a faster advancement, but therefore fail to create
the desired defector-free state. The Achilles heel of adaptive
rewarding is thus an excessively aggressive invasion of defec-
tors that neglects the benefits of network reciprocity. This, in
turn, may explain why, despite of its success, rewarding is not
as firmly weaved into our societal organization as punishment.
VIII. EVOLUTIONARY OUTCOMESWITH ANTISOCIAL
STRATEGIES
Another important but thus far overlooked aspect of pun-
ishment and rewarding is that people do not always use this
actions for the right reasons. Sometimes people are rewarded
for antisocial actions, and sometimes punishment is applied
to people despite their prosocial activities. In fact, research
across different human societies has shown that antisocial
punishment is significantly more common than one might
have expected [87]. There also exist evidence that human
punishment is motivated by inequity aversion rather than by
the desire for reciprocity [276], which also leaves ample room
for reasoning as to why someone might engage in misuse of
punishment. In what follow, we review research on antisocial
strategies in the public goods game separately for punishment
and rewarding.
A. Antisocial punishment and the crumbling of cooperation
enforcement
Unfortunately, a dedicated effort to study antisocial punish-
ment has not yet been made in the realm of statistical physics,
at least not in the same sense as peer punishment (see Sec-
tion VA), pool punishment (see Section VIA), and adaptive
punishment (see Section VIIA) have been studied separately
in the spatial public goods game with a focus on phase transi-
tions, pattern formation, and self-organization. Nevertheless,
in [122, 123] authors have considered antisocial punishment
in the realm of human cooperation, and we here briefly review
their main results.
Results presented in Fig. 28 show convincingly that allow-
ing antisocial punishment significantly reduces the effective-
ness of punishment to promote cooperation in the optional
public goods game. In fact, the likelihood of a cooperative
outcome with antisocial punishment present is about the same
as in the absence of any punishment. Furthermore, behav-
ioral experiments conducted to verify these theoretical pre-
dictions also deliver much the same results [123], as do re-
sults obtained in the realm of score-dependent viability dy-
namics [277] and the corresponding spatially structured lat-
tice model reported in [122]. In short, antisocial punishment
is clearly responsible for the crumbling of cooperation en-
forcement in the optional public goods game with punish-
ment. Given the relative abundance of such antisocial be-
havior in human societies [87], one rightfully questions the
whole concept of punishment, and whether positive interac-
tions might be the better way forward [56, 57]. Indeed, while
the majority of previous studies addressing the “stick versus
carrot” dilemma concluded that punishment is more effective
than reward in sustaining cooperation [67], evidence suggest-
ing that rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead
to higher total earnings without potential damage to reputa-
tion [133, 278] or fear from retaliation [56] is certainly there.
Research in the realm of antisocial punishment done thus far
delivers solid evidence that antisocial punishment renders the
concept of sanctioning ineffective, and further support the idea
that healthy levels of human cooperation are likelier to be
achieved through less destructive means.
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FIG. 28: Antisocial punishment and the evolution of cooperation in
the optional public goods game. For details of the model we refer
to [123]. It can be observed that the inclusion of antisocial punish-
ment to the strategy set (panel c) returns the level of cooperation in
the population to where it was without punishment (panel a). Only
if solely the traditional punishment of defectors is allowed, then the
likelihood of a more cooperative outcome is higher (panel b). The
statistics has been obtained by randomly drawing game parameters
from representative intervals and simulating 105 independent out-
comes. Figure reproduced with permission from [123].
B. Lack of adverse effects with antisocial rewarding
Unlike antisocial punishment briefly reviewed in the previ-
ous subsection, antisocial rewarding has received a dedicated
effort in terms of the application of statistical physics meth-
ods in [62], where the focus was on the public goods game
with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to de-
termine the potential negative consequences on the effective-
ness of positive incentives to promote cooperation (see Sec-
tion IIIC 2 for the definition of the model). Contrary to a
naive expectation, it was shown that the ability of defectors
to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public coop-
eration as long as cooperators are able to do the same. In fact,
even in the presence of antisocial rewarding the spatial selec-
tion for cooperation, i.e., network reciprocity, was found to be
enhanced.
Figure 29 shows the phase diagram for the whole r1 − r2
parameter plane, as obtained with Monte Carlo simulations.
Starting with the r2 = 1 line, which implies the absence
of pool rewarding, it can be observed that cooperators sur-
vive only if the critical value of r1 is r1c > 3.74 [166] (see
Section III A). The fact that this value is still lower than the
group size G = 5, which would be the threshold in a well-
mixed population, is due to network reciprocity. The latter
enables cooperators to form compact clusters and so protect
themselves against being wiped out by defectors [31]. Tak-
ing this as a reference value, we can appreciate at a glance
that, even in the presence of antisocial rewarding, prosocial
rewarding still promotes the evolution of cooperation. How-
ever, neither defectors (D) nor cooperators (C) who abstain
from pool rewarding can survive if r2 > 1. Indeed, only re-
warding defectors (RD) and rewarding cooperators (RC) re-
main in the stationary state, depending on the value of r1 and
r2. This outcome can be understood since players that do en-
gage in pool rewarding collect payoffs that exceed their initial
contributions to the rewarding pool.
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FIG. 29: Phase diagram of the spatial public goods game with an-
tisocial and prosocial pool rewarding, demonstrating that antisocial
rewarding does not hinder prosocial rewarding to promote coopera-
tion. Depicted are strategies that remain on the square lattice after
sufficiently long relaxation times as a function of the multiplication
factor for the public goods pool r1 and the multiplication factor for
the antisocial and prosocial rewarding pool r2. Solid blue lines de-
note continuous phase transitions. Figure reproduced with permis-
sion from [62].
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FIG. 30: Evolution of the spatial distribution of strategies in the spatial public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding
over time reveals that, even in the presence of equally effective antisocial rewarding, prosocial rewarding promotes the spatial selection for
cooperation. Depicted are snapshots of the square lattice over time from left to right, as obtained for r2 = 1 (top row), r2 = 1.3 (middle row),
and r2 = 2 (bottom row). For clarity, a prepared initial state has been used for all cases with only a stripe of rewarding cooperators (blue) and
rewarding defectors (pale red) initially present in the population, as depicted in panel (f). It can be observed that in the absence of rewarding
(top row) the interface separating the two competing strategies is broken easily, and network reciprocity alone can ultimately sustain only small
cooperative clusters. However, as the effectiveness of pool rewarding increases (middle and bottom row), the interface is strengthened, which
makes the phalanx of cooperators more effective. The latter helps to reveal the benefit of aggregated cooperators in structured populations. In
all three cases the synergy factor for the main public goods game is r1 = 3.8. Figure reproduced with permission from [62].
In terms of the relation between RD and RC players, re-
sults in Fig. 29 show that the introduction of strategy-neutral
pool rewarding unambiguously supports the cooperative strat-
egy. In particular, as the value of r2 increases and with it also
the efficiency of rewarding, the critical value of r1 where RC
players are able to survive decreases steadily. Likewise de-
creasing is the r1 threshold for complete dominance of theRD
strategy. At specific values of r1, for example at r1 = 3.5, it
is even possible to go from the pureRD phase to the pureRC
phase solely by increasing the value of r2. Thus indeed, even
if the prosocial pool rewarding scheme is accompanied by an
equally effective antisocial pool rewarding scheme, in struc-
tured populations the evolution of cooperation from a neutral
or even from an adverse initial state is still promoted well past
the boundaries imposed by network reciprocity alone.
An obvious question is why this is the case? As frequently
emphasized throughout this review, an in-depth analysis of the
emerging special patters from prepared initial conditions pro-
vides the answer, which in this case is rooted in the possible
aggregation of cooperators, which can easily emerge sponta-
neously in a structured population. It is therefore instructive
to monitor the evolution of the spatial distribution of strate-
gies over time, as obtained for different values of r2. Results,
where for clarity a prepared initial state with only a stripe of
rewarding cooperators (blue) and rewarding defectors (pale
red) has been used, as illustrated in panel (f), are presented
in Fig. 30.
The top row of Fig. 30 shows the evolution obtained at
r2 = 1, which corresponds to the traditional, reward-free pub-
lic goods game. It can be observed that the initially straight
interface separating the two competing strategies disintegrates
practically immediately. There is a very noticeable mixing of
the two strategies, which ultimately helps defectors to occupy
the larger part of the available space. Here cooperators are
able to survive solely due to network reciprocity, but at such a
relatively small value of r1 only small cooperative clusters are
sustainable. Snapshots depicted in the middle row of Fig. 30
were obtained at r2 = 1.3, where thus both antisocial and
prosocial pool rewarding mechanisms are at work. Here the
final state is still a mixed RC + RD phase (see also Fig. 29),
but the fraction of cooperators is already significantly larger
than in the absence of rewarding. Larger cooperative clusters
are sustainable in the stationary state, which is due to an aug-
mented interfacial stability between competing domains. In
addition to traditional network reciprocity, clearly the forma-
tion of more compact cooperative clusters is further promoted
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by the introduction of pool rewarding, and this despite the fact
that both antisocial and prosocial rewarding mechanisms are
equally strong. If an even higher value of r2 is applied, the
interface that separates RC and RD players becomes impen-
etrable for defectors. The two strategies do not mix at all,
which maintains the phalanx of cooperators. Accordingly, the
latter players simply spread into the region of defectors until
they dominate completely. This scenario is demonstrated in
the bottom row of Fig. 30, where the final stationary state is
indeed a pure RC phase.
As demonstrated in the middle and the bottom row of
Fig. 30, the introduction of pool rewarding supports the ag-
gregation of akin players and results in more stable interfaces
between competing domains. Since the administration of re-
wards to either strategy requires a considerable degree of ag-
gregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial
contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors
when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial re-
wards, but due to their lack of contributions to the public good
they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a
sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of
akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behavior,
thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.
This argument also explains why the same positive outcome is
not attainable from a random initial state in well-mixed pop-
ulations, where it was concluded that the possibility of anti-
social rewarding utterly shatters any evolutionary benefits to
cooperators that might be stemming from prosocial rewards
[176]. If the interactions among players are well-mixed, then
of course neither cooperators nor defectors can aggregate lo-
cally, which is a fundamental condition to reveal the long-term
benefits of cooperation in a collective enterprize, even if the
population contains strategies that seek to actively promote
antisocial behavior.
IX. TOLERANCE AND COOPERATION
As stated in the introduction, tolerance is a rather unique
human ability, which manifests as a steadfast endurance of
a trying circumstance with a fair and objective attitude. In
this sense, it is quite far removed from positive and negative
reciprocity, like rewarding and punishment, that we have fo-
cused on thus far in this review. Nevertheless, it is important
to take tolerance into account when studying human coopera-
tion, which is why, in the next two subsections, we will review
statistical physics research dedicated to the benefits of toler-
ance [82] and the impact of diverse tolerance levels [85] in the
realm of the spatial public goods game.
A. The benefits of tolerance
The benefits of tolerance can be studied best with a slightly
simplified version of the model reviewed in Section III E,
where instead of several different types of tolerant players
only one type is present in the population, with a tolerance
thresholdH . Research based on this model revealed that some
tolerance toward defectors can not only save cooperation if the
multiplication factor r is low, but also result in a surprisingly
high average payoff in the population [82]. Notably, if only
loners are added to the public goods game cooperation can be
sustained [186], but the average payoff is no larger than the
low default income of the loners [194, 195]. Phase diagrams
and the underlying spatial patterns reveal a high complexity
of stationary states, where cyclic dominance and two-strategy
alliances characterize evolutionary outcomes.
Figure 31 shows representative phase diagrams in depen-
dence on the cost of knowing the strategy of the other players
in the group γ and the multiplication factor r. In general,
it can be observed that, if the inspection cost γ is too large,
tolerant players (M ) always die out. As a result, the classi-
cal three-strategy (D,C,L) model is recovered [186]. In this
case, traditional cooperators (C) can survive for r ≥ 2.19 due
to cyclic dominance and form the three-strategyDCL phase.
If the synergy factor r is high enough, and consequently coop-
erators and defectors can coexist due to network reciprocity,
the cyclic dominance among the three strategies is broken and
the loners die out. However, the evolutionary outcomes are
significantly different for lower γ values and intermediate val-
ues of r, where theM strategy is able to survive.
The lowest nonzero threshold H = 1 is a special case be-
cause here the tolerant players (M ) can survive with defec-
tors (D) only in the presence of traditional cooperators (C).
Due to the low threshold, an M player can change from the
C to the L state immediately when it recognizes the presence
of a defector in the group. The previously mentioned DCL
cyclic dominance is established, but instead of this cycle the
strategies M → D → C → M form the closed loop of
dominance. In other words, L is simply replaced byM . The
evolutionary stability of this three-strategy phase in relation to
other possible phases depends on the average rotation speed
within the phase. Namely, the faster the invasion rate, the
more stable a cyclic dominance phase [279]. By increasing
the value of r, it is possible to observe a reentrant phase tran-
sition (D+C+L)→ (D+C+M)→ (D+C+L), which
is a general behavior when the average invasion rates within a
cycle can be adjusted by varying a control parameter [280].
Staying with the phase diagrams in Fig. 31, if the tolerance
threshold H increases, thus allowing M players to tolerate
more defectors within the group, then new types of solutions
emerge. Namely, tolerant players can coexist with defectors
without the presence of a third strategy. As was shown in
[82], the D +M phase can be particularly efficient in terms
of the average payoff in the population. In addition to the
two-strategyD +M phase, there are parameter values where
all four competing strategies coexist, and there are some spe-
cific cases where tolerant players crowds out cooperators but
stay together with loners in the presence of defectors. Here
defectors and tolerant players are still capable to form a two-
strategy alliance, but loners can invade defectors. As a result,
small loner patches emerge temporarily, but they are vulnera-
ble against the invasion of tolerant players, who are capable of
utilizing network reciprocity and thus close theD+M+L cy-
cle of dominance. A stable coexistence of all four strategies,
namely theD + C +M + L phase, is also observable.
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FIG. 31: Full r − γ phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with tolerant players, as obtained for H = 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the
square lattice. Different phases are denoted by the symbols of the strategies that survive in the final strategy distribution. Solid lines represent
continuous, whereas dashed lines indicate discontinuous phase transitions between stable solutions. Figure reproduced with permission from
[82].
The comparison of phase diagrams obtained for different
tolerance thresholds in Fig. 31 highlights that there is an opti-
mal intermediate tolerance level which provides the best con-
dition for tolerant players to survive, even if the inspection
cost γ is relatively high. It is important to note that tolerant
players always bear this cost, in addition to the cost of co-
operation when they act as cooperators within a group (when
the number of defectors in the group is sufficiently low). At
H = 2, for example, tolerant players pay nearly double the
cost of traditional cooperators, yet are still able to outcompete
them as well as the loners. Taken together, neither too small
nor too high tolerance levels are good. At an intermediate tol-
erance level, however, tolerant players provide a significant
boost to cooperation, assuring moreover that the average pay-
offs in the population remain high [82].
A deeper understanding as to why tolerance promotes coop-
eration can be obtained, once again, by studying the evolution
of emerging spatial patterns from a prepared initial state, as
illustrated in Fig. 32. It should be emphasized that the three-
strategy D + C + L phase is always a solution in the low-r
region [186]. To understand the superiority of the D + M
phase, it is necessary to start the evolution from a special, pre-
pared initial state where the two phases can first evolve calmly
in a restricted area. Panel (a) of Fig. 32 illustrates the final
result of the two isolated evolutions. After this, the borders
open up, and the competition of subsystem solutions starts.
The elementary steps of this competition can be identified in
panel (b), which is zoomed out in panel (d) for clarity. In this
snapshot, we can distinguish three different cases of how the
three-strategy solution meets with the two-strategy D + M
phase. If a C domain, marked by dark blue, is at the fron-
tier, then cooperators start spreading in the sea of M . These
invasions are marked by “I” in panel (d). The success of C,
however, is temporary, because defectors, marked by red, will
follow them and gradually invade the invaders. This stage
is marked by “II” in panel (d). Subsequently, when D play-
ers remain alone with M players, the latter (marked by light
blue) regulate the defectors and lower their concentration to
a minimal level. The second option of how competing solu-
tions meet in this case is when a D spot from the D + C + L
phase meets with the D +M phase. This is marked by “III”
in panel (d). Here the previously described regulation pro-
cess starts immediately, which will decrease the area of the
D + C + L phase. Finally, when an L domain (marked by
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FIG. 32: The competition of two possible solutions in the spatial
public goods game with tolerance at r = 2.7, γ = 0.15, andH = 2.
Defectors are denoted red, cooperators are denoted dark blue, tol-
erant players are denoted light blue, and loners are denoted green,
as indicated by the legend at the top of the figure. At these param-
eter values both the D + C + L cyclic dominance phase and the
two-strategy D +M phase are stable subsystem solutions (see Sec-
tion IVD for details). Panel (a) illustrates a prepared initial state
where the D + C + L phase is embraced by the D +M phase. In
panel (b), the interface is opened up for strategy invasions, and hence
the two subsystem solutions can start competing for space. Eventu-
ally theD+M solution starts to dominate, as illustrated in panel (c),
and finally the two-strategy phase prevails completely (not shown).
Panel (d) shows the enlarged part of panel (b) to illustrate the micro-
scopic mechanisms that are responsible for the successful invasion
of theD+M phase. The snapshots were taken at 0, 70 and 210 full
Monte Carlo steps. Figure reproduced with permission from [82].
green) is at the interface then it will shrink immediately be-
causeM is able to utilize the positive impact of network reci-
procity. This process is marked by “IV” in panel (d). To-
gether, these four elementary processes will reduce the middle
area occupied by the three-strategy phase. Lastly, a negative
feedback sets in, which is related to the shrinkage of the three-
strategy area. Namely, as space becomes sparse, theD+C+L
phase becomes more vulnerable against external invasions be-
cause the amplitude of local oscillations within the phase be-
comes larger and larger the smaller the patches, which is a
well-known phenomenon in the realm of cyclic dominance
[192] (although the amplitude can increase also due to other
reasons, as reviewed in Section VC, Fig. 18 in particular).
Consequently, when the width of the three-strategy phase in
the middle becomes comparable to the typical size of the
smallest sustainable D + C + L patches the three-strategy
phase can be easily trapped into a homogeneous state because
one strategy within the cyclic alliance is destined to die out.
This stage is illustrated in panel (c) of Fig. 32, after which the
D +M phase can easily invade the rest of the population.
We conclude this subsection by noting that tolerance has
been considered before also in myopically selective interac-
tions in the realm of social dilemmas, showing that it pro-
motes cooperation [83], as well as in the realm of an adaptive
environment, where it was found that social tolerance allows
cooperation to prevail [81].
B. Diverse tolerance levels
To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be
stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, an
upgrade to the model reviewed in the above subsection has
been studied in [85], where instead of a single tolerance level
in the population, all four possible tolerant strategies could
compete at once (see Section III E for the definition of the
model). Research revealed that the diversity of tolerance can
give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a differ-
ent threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in
a group compete most effectively against defection and lon-
ers. Such synergistic associations can stabilize states of full
cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate. A
highlight of this model are almost invisible yet stable strat-
egy alliances that are driven by complex pattern formation in
a structured population.
The main phase diagram of the model is presented in
Fig. 33. These results reveal several fundamental features that
can be associated with the viability of tolerant strategies in
the public goods game. It can be observed that the higher
the value of r, the higher the tolerance can be, and vice versa.
This observation resonates with our naive expectation and per-
ception of tolerance in that overly tolerant strategies cannot
survive in the presence of other less tolerant strategies. From
the viewpoint of the considered evolutionary game this is not
surprising, because players adopting the M4 strategy act as
loners only if everybody else in the group is a defector. And
such sheer unlimited tolerance is simply not competitive with
other less tolerant strategies. Also, if the cost of inspection γ
is too high, or if the value of the synergy factor is either very
low or very high, then tolerant players cannot survive even if
they exhibit different levels of tolerance. This observation is
in agreement with research reviewed in Section IXA, where
only uniform tolerance levels were considered [82].
More precisely, as results in Fig. 33 reveal, at very low
values of r, similarly as in the simplest three-strategy DCL
model, the loners prevail. At slightly larger values of r, this
single-strategy phase gives way to the three-strategy phase
where D,C, and L strategies dominate each other cyclically.
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FIG. 33: Full phase diagram of the 8-strategy public goods game with diverse tolerance levels on the r − γ parameter plane, as obtained
on a square lattice. Dashed lines denote discontinuous, while solid lines mark continuous phase transitions. There exist regions where the
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denotes those parameter values where the population evolves into a full-cooperator, defector-freeM1 +M2 phase, but only if the system size
is large enough. We attend to these invisible solutions in detail in Fig. 35. Figure reproduced with permission from [85].
Interestingly, unlike in the uniform tolerance public goods
game [82], here the D → C → L → D closed loop of dom-
inance is the only way for loners to survive at higher r values
[186]. In all the other cases the loners die out due to the fact
that the diversity of tolerant players is able to provide a more
competitive response to the exploitation of defectors. Indeed,
if the synergy factor is increased further, we find that, through
a succession of different phase transitions, theD+C+L phase
gives way to a rich variety of two-, three- or even four-strategy
phases, in all of which tolerant strategies are present. These
solutions are theD+C+M1, theD+M2, theD+C+M2,
and theD+C+M3 phase, as well as two four-strategy phases
D+C+M1+M2 andD+C+M2+M3, which are unique
to the public goods game with diverse strategy levels.
According to the phase diagram in Fig. 33, the first transi-
tion from theD+C+L phase to one of the mentioned phases
is always discontinuous. The accurate position of these kind
of phase transition points, as denoted by the dashed line in the
phase diagram, can only be determined by means of a stabil-
ity analysis of competing subsystem solutions, as described
in Section IVD. In this Section, Fig. 10 shows the compe-
tition between the three-strategy D + C + L phase and the
four-strategy D + C +M1 +M2 phase at both sides of the
discontinuous phase transition point, although on both sides
the two phases are individually stable, i.e., are proper subsys-
tem solutions. We refer to Section IVD for details, and we
emphasize again this to be the only viable way to accurately
determine the position of such phase transitions.
In order to understand how the combination of different
tolerant strategies is the most effective response to a public
goods dilemma, a series of snapshots that is carefully engi-
neered to illustrate exactly what otherwise remains invisible if
a small population starts from a random initial state, is shown
in Fig. 34. In panel (a), the evolution starts from a small
200 × 200 sqaure lattice where initially all eight strategies
are distributed uniformly at random. After a relatively short
relaxation time only D and M2 players survive in panel (b)
to form what appears to be the dominating two-strategy phase
at these parameter values. In fact, this D +M2 phase is the
dominant stable solution in the previously reviewed uniform-
tolerance public goods game in Section IXA. But in the game
reviewed here, we have other options because of the diverse
tolerance levels that we consider. Therefore, to test the stabil-
ity of the D +M2 phase properly, small compact patches of
other strategies are inserted manually in panel (c). These are
the pure cooperators (C), the loners (L), and the tolerant strat-
egy (M1), positioned from the left-upper part of the lattice in
a clockwise manner. Subsequently, panels (d) and (e) demon-
strate clearly that first the loners die out, followed by the pure
cooperators. However, the M1 strategy forms a powerful al-
liance with theM2 strategy, whose domain is able to grow, as
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FIG. 34: Finite-size effects may lead to misleading evolutionary outcomes in the 8-strategy public goods game with diverse tolerance levels.
At the beginning, the evolution is started from a random initial state where all the eight strategies are present [panel (a)]. After the relaxation of
1000MCS [panel (b)], onlyD (red) andM2 (ochre) strategies survive, which also form the stable two-strategy phase in the uniform-tolerance
public goods game at the same parameter values (r = 2.97 and γ = 0.35) (see Section IXA). In panel (c), small compact patches of three other
strategies are then manually re-introduced, namely strategy C (blue), strategy L loner (green), and strategy M1 (yellow). Soon afterwards,
loners die out (again) very soon within theD+M2 phase, as shown in panel (d). Later, C players also die out, but tolerant strategiesM1 and
M2 form a successful alliance, as shown in panel (e). Indeed, theM1+M2 subsystem solution turns out to be stronger than theD+M2 phase,
and the population terminates in a defector-free state, as shown in panel (f). The system size used in this example is L = 200, while stages
presented in panels (d), (e), and (f) were obtained after 30, 250, and 1300 full Monte Carlo steps from panel (c) onwards. Importantly, as we
review in Fig. 35, the defector-free state can evolve naturally from a random initial state if the system size is large enough. Figure reproduced
with permission from [85].
out, and in the final state illustrated in panel (f), only the two
different tolerant strategies remain to provide the maximal co-
operation level in the defector-free state. Thus, it turns out
that the M1 + M2 subsystem solution is ultimately stronger
than the D + M2 subsystem solution. This outcome can be
interpreted so thatM2 players are efficient at sweeping out C
and L players, who, as the two extreme limits of tolerance,
prevent otherM strategies to function efficiently. At the same
time,M1 players are capable to beat strategyD. Accordingly,
we need the features of bothM1 andM2 players to reach the
happy end.
The example shown in Fig. 34 highlights that the order in
which the strategies die out is crucial for the final evolution-
ary outcome. To give a more quantitatively accurate predic-
tion of whether the system will terminate into theD +M2 or
the M1 +M2 phase, we show in Fig. 35 the fixation proba-
bility to the latter for different combinations of r and γ. For
these results, the evolution always started from a random ini-
tial state (containing all the eight strategies distributed uni-
formly at random), and it was simply counted howmany times
the system terminates into theM1 +M2 phase. The alterna-
tive destination of the evolutionary process was to arrive to the
D +M2 phase, which for all the considered parameter com-
binations used in Fig. 35 is the only other stable subsystem
solution. To get a reliable statistics, independent runs were
repeated 1000 times for L = 100− 1000 linear system sizes,
while for even larger lattices 500 independent runs were made.
The results depicted in Fig. 35 show a remarkable finite-size
effect. More precisely, there are parameter values of r and γ
where the strategyC dies out first, thus allowing theM1+M2
phase to conquer the whole system. But this solution remains
completely invisible if the system size is too small. To con-
clude, these are the specific combinations of the parameters
r and γ that are shaded grey in the phase diagram shown in
Fig. 33 – these are the invisible solutions for the large majority
of the system sizes that are in widespread use in the literature
nowadays.
These results ultimately highlight the delicate importance
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FIG. 35: The invisible solutions in the public goods game with di-
verse tolerance levels. Fixation probability for theM1 +M2 phase,
as obtained for γ = 0.35 (top) and for r = 3.0 (bottom) in de-
pendence on the other key parameter, respectively. The linear size
of the applied square lattices are indicated in the legend. Remark-
ably, there exist combinations of parameters r and γ at which, even
at 500×500 system size, theM1+M2 solution remains completely
invisible, even though at a much larger 6000 × 6000 system size
the fixation probability for the exact same solution is 1. Depicted
probabilities are averaged over 500-1000 independent runs. Figure
reproduced with permission from [85].
of diversity and tolerance for human cooperation, and they re-
veal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that
is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured
populations. The latter can be studied and understood only
by means of statistical physics methods, applied in a rigorous
and systematic manner. As we hope this review shows, this is
the fundamental nature of research in the realm of statistical
physics of human cooperation.
X. SUMMARY
We have provided a systematic review of statistical physics
research done to advance our understanding of human cooper-
ation, in particular focusing on the application of Monte Carlo
methods and the theory of phase transitions to understand pat-
tern formation, the spatiotemporal dynamics of solutions, and
the principles of self-organization that may lead to socially fa-
vorable evolutionary outcomes. In the Introduction, we have
described human cooperation as the result of our evolution-
ary struggles for survival, and as the cornerstone of our evo-
lutionary success story. We have also outlined the pressing
challenges of our time, which are in large parts due to failing
cooperation in our societies, and we have introduced statisti-
cal physics as the key to understanding counterintuitive evo-
lutionary outcomes in structured populations.
In Section II, we have first reviewed human experiments
as a critical tool for testing predictions of theoretical models
and investigating human cooperation. We have emphasized
that existing experiments provide clear evidence that people
behave prosocially, that they are willing to enforce prosocial-
ity, and that it matters whether the structure of the interaction
network is taken into account.
In Section III, we have introduced the spatial public goods
game as the null model for human cooperation, and we have
subsequently provided a description of various extensions of
this model incorporating punishment, rewards, correlated pos-
itive and negative reciprocity, as well as tolerance.
In the continuation, we have then provided a description
of the most important Monte Carlo methods for the study
of human cooperation in Section IV. In particular, we have
described random sequential strategy updating, we have dis-
cussed the role and limitations of random initial conditions,
we have briefly reviewed the most important concepts of
phase transitions, and we have presented in detail the stability
analysis of subsystem solutions.
The main results obtained in the realm of statistical physics
of humans cooperation have been reviewed from Section V
onwards, firstly for peer-based strategies, secondly for institu-
tionalized strategies, thirdly in the realm of self-organization
of incentives for cooperation, then for evolutionary outcomes
obtained with antisocial strategies, and lastly related to the
impact of tolerance on human cooperation. By peer-based
strategies in Section V, we have emphasized the importance of
indirect territorial competition in peer punishment, the spon-
taneous emergence of cyclic dominance in peer rewarding,
and an exotic first-order phase transition observed with corre-
lated strategies. By institutionalized strategies in Section VI,
we have highlighted the fascinating spatiotemporal complex-
ity that is due to pool punishment, as well as the virtual non-
existence of institutionalized rewarding on its own right. In
the realm of self-organization of incentives for cooperation in
Section VII, we have emphasized the elevated effectiveness
of adaptive punishment, the possibility of probabilistic shar-
ing to solve the problem of costly punishment, and the many
evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding. By antisocial
strategies in Section VIII, we have reviewed the devastating
effects of antisocial punishment on cooperation enforcement,
and the rather surprising lack of similarly adverse effects with
antisocial rewarding. Lastly, in Section IX, we have reviewed
the benefits of tolerance for human cooperation, as stemming
from unique and diverse tolerance levels.
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XI. FUTURE RESEARCH AND OUTLOOK
Statistical physics of human cooperation has, over the past
decade, led to many new insights into which strategies, mech-
anisms, and external factors promote prosocial outcomes in
competitive settings, and it has led to a fundamentally bet-
ter understanding as to why exactly this is the case [14–17].
However, an integrative approach that would aim to merge all
the different mathematical models together into a more cohe-
sive, and thus also relevant, theoretical framework is lacking.
While this review can be considered a modest step in this di-
rection, from afar, it likely still looks like we are considering
little fractions of the problem at a time. This proposition is of
course a formidable challenge, but it is also a necessity for the
wider recognition of this line of research outside the realm of
physics. Some inspiration and guidance to aid the cause can
be found in the many works on the subject stemming from an-
thropology, psychology, and sociology [55, 78, 79, 281–283],
which to date are still insufficiently, if at all, integrated into
theoretical research.
There are also several hypotheses available to explain why
cooperation is so widespread and common in human soci-
eties that have not yet been introduced to evolutionary games.
The “heart on your sleeve” hypothesis, for example, asserts
that humans are cooperative because they can truthfully sig-
nal cooperative intentions. Indeed, recent research indicates
that third-party punishment is precisely such a costly signal
of trustworthiness among humans [71]. Moreover, cultural
group selection hypotheses argue that the importance of cul-
ture in determining human behavior causes selection among
groups to be more important for humans than for other an-
imals. There also exist moralistic reciprocity hypotheses,
which argue that greater human cognitive abilities and ad-
vanced language allow us to manage larger networks of reci-
procity. Such hypotheses could potentially be verified in the
realm of evolutionary games in structured populations, and
thus become susceptible to research by means of statistical
physics methods. More precisely, information sharing and the
reliability of shared information across different networks rep-
resenting different groups or populations could reveal whether
honest signalling is indeed crucial. In terms of the integra-
tion of cognitive abilities, Bear and Rand [284] have recently
introduced a new model for looking at the evolution of intu-
ition versus deliberation as well as at the evolution of coop-
eration versus defection, which also lends itself to research
in structured populations and in presence of coevolutionary
rules [15].
The current theoretical framework also fails to account for
the differences among us in terms of our goals and status.
Both these factors determine, or at least affect, our behavior.
A wealthy individual might look at the potential personal loss
in a social dilemma situation differently than a poor individ-
ual. Thus, each time we are faced with the choice of either co-
operating or defecting, we should also take into account what
we risk to loose as individuals, and what we are striving for.
In the realm of these considerations, evolutionary multigames
[69, 285–287] appear as a promising mathematical founda-
tion for properly taking into account such upgrades to existing
models. Alternatives to imitation dynamics, such as myopic
best response microscopic dynamics [204, 205, 207] and its
variants [215], also merit more research in the realm of the
public goods game, in particular as they are more akin to an
innovative analysis of a particular situation and thus useful to
model human behavior.
Antisocial strategies, in general, have also not yet been
studied systematically in the realm of statistical physics, an
exception being antisocial pool rewarding in competition with
prosocial pool rewarding [62], where it was shown that anti-
social efforts, rather surprisingly, do not deter public coopera-
tion. Existing research points to a rather devastating effect of
antisocial punishment on cooperation enforcement [122, 123],
but a dedicated effort to check the stability of subsystem so-
lutions in the spatial public goods game with antisocial pun-
ishment, either peer- or pool-based, as well as with antisocial
rewarding, is still lacking.
Looking forward, physicists have to reach out and work to-
gether more closely with social scientists, and with their help
merge, refine, and upgrade current models so that they will
become even more relevant for human cooperation. An out-
line of the challenges ahead in this endeavor is provided in
Section II. While we should of course utilize methods of sta-
tistical physics and network science to the fullest, we should
also do our best to ensure a solid and plausible social em-
bedding for our research. In this, we can connect to existing
interdisciplinary applications of statistical physics, for exam-
ple to better understand the economy [288–294], to mitigate
crime [18], to promote vaccination [20], to predict and prevent
epidemics [19], and to save lives [295], but we also need help
from outside of physics if we wish to come up with useful
models that will help guide our efforts towards a sustainable
and better future. Research reviewed above has the poten-
tial to have a deeply positive impact on pressing challenges of
our time, many of which are due precisely because of large-
scale failures of cooperation. Ultimately, we must learn how
to create organizations, governments, and societies that are
more cooperative and more egalitarian, and perhaps most im-
portantly, are driven not by policy and law that can often be
tricked, but simply by a higher level of collective intelligence
stemming from each individual.
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